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A RIGHT TO NO MEANINGFUL 
REVIEW UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE: THE AFTERMATH OF 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES 
Ruqaiijah A. Yearbyt 
INTRODUCTION 
No one ever looks forward to entering a nursing home because it 
means leaving the things most dear to them: family, home, and inde-
pendence. Nevertheless, without the current nursing home system, 1 
many elderly and disabled persons, who require comprehensive treat-
ment, would not have access to necessary care. 2 In 2000, nursing 
homes provided care to 1.6 million elderly and disabled persons, and 
t Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.A. 
(Honors Biology) 1996, University of Michigan; J.D. 2000, Georgetown University 
Law Center; M.P.H. 2000, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. For their sugges-
tions and comments I would like to thank John Blum, Raquel daFonseca, Marshall -
Kapp, Jeff Kwall, Jason Lundy, Nicholas Lynn, Matthew Murer, Roderick Nelson, 
Larry Singer, Spencer Waller, and Neil Wiiliams. I also want to express my sincere 
gratitude to the librarians that assisted me, Head Librarian Julia Wentz and Julienne 
Grant, and for their able research, I thank Melissa Pittman, Timothy Rozoff, Damon 
Doucet, and Jennifer Ballard. My gratitude also extends to my mom, Ayanna Yearby, 
and grandma, Irene Robinson, for their assistance. 
1 Three main parties fund nursing homes: Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
parties. Of the payments received by nursing homes in 2001, Medicare accounted for 
11.7 percent, Medicaid for 47.5 percent, and private payors (including out-of-pocket, 
private health insurance, and other private funds) were responsible for 38.5 percent. 
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of the Actuary, Table 13: Nursing 
Home Care Expenditures Aggregate and per Capita Amounts, Percent Distribution 
and Average Annual Percent Change by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 
1980-20 I 2, http://63.24 1.27. 79/statistics/nhe/projections-2002/tl3.asp (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2006). Medicare spending on nursing home care totaled $9.5 billion in 2000 
and $I I .6 billion in 200 I. !d. 
2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-02-431R, NURSING HOME 
EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d0243lr.pdf (report on the necessity of well-staffed nursing home facilities). 
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by 2050, nursing homes are projected to provide care to 6.6 million 
elderly and disabled persons.3 Thus, we can ill afford to cripple the 
nursing home industry. But, this is exactly what has occurred. The 
Constitution,4 the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A),5 and the 
Medicare Act6 and regulations 7 mandate that nursing homes be af-
forded procedural due process rights before the loss of the property, 
namely Medicare payments.8 This article will show that the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS)9 has unduly restricted 
the rights of nursing homes by denying them access to Medicare 10 
3 Encyclopedia of American Industries, SIC 8051 Skilled Nursing Care 
Facilities, http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Service/Skilled-Nursing-
Care-Facilities.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). Medicare spending on nursing home 
care totaled $9.5 billion in 2000 and $11.6 billion in 2001. See Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., supra note 1, at tbl.l3. 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V & XN, § 1. 
5 Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S. C.). 
6 See Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 
79 .Stat. 290 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Medicare 
Act is a section of the Social Security Act. See Social Security Act (Old Age Pension 
Act), Pub. L. No. 109-80, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). The hearing requirements and limitations concerning nursing homes are 
found both in the Social Security Act and the Medicare Act. Therefore, throughout 
the article both the Social Security Act and the Medicare Act are discussed. 
7 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-66 (2005). 
8 No federal court has ruled that Medicare payments constitute property; · 
however, most courts ignore this issue and simply review the merits of the case. See, 
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (ignoring the issue of whether Medi-
care payments constitute property and reviewing the merits of the case); Heckler v. 
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 
667 (1986); Jordan Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 276 F.3d 72 (lst Cir. 2002). 
9 The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was renamed the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1980. Department of Edu-
cation Organization Act of 1979 § 509(e), Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 695 (codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 3508 (2000)). For simplicity and continuity, this article refers to the 
agency only as HHS. 
10 Medicare is a federal entitlement program to pay for health insurance for 
the elderly and disabled. See COMM. ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 238-45 (1986) [hereinafter 
IOM REPORT]. See also PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE ... FROM 
IDEA TO LAW app. A (1969). This article will primarily focus on issues relating to the 
Medicare Act because federal regulation of nursing homes takes place almost exclu-
sively under Medicare. Even though nursing homes are similarly regulated under the 
Medicaid Act, each state administers its own Medicaid program based on distinct 
rules promulgated and implemented by that individual state. The federal government 
does provide guidance regarding Medicaid regulation; however, the federal govern-
ment does not actively supervise the activities of regulating nursing homes other than 
in budgetary matters. Medicaid will only be discussed as it pertains to changes in the 
Medicare program. 
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compliance hearings. I argue that the denial of a nursing home's pro-
cedural due process rights by HHS is a constitutional and statutory 
violation that the Supreme Court erroneously affirmed by its decision 
in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council). 11 
Specifically, this denial of procedural due process rights occurs when 
HHS determines that a nursing home is in violation of the Medicare 
regulations. If HHS fails to impose or rescinds the "remedies"12 im-
posed for a nursing home's alleged noncompliance, nursing homes do 
not have a right to a hearing. 13 HHS claims no hearing is required 
because it is not depriving the nursing home of property, namely 
Medicare payments, and there is no harm. 14 
Even without the imposition of a remedy, however, HHS, argua-
bly, is still depriving the nursing home of Medicare payments and 
harming nursing homes in a variety of ways. HHS uses these unre-
viewable findings of noncompliance as the basis for increasing the 
severity of remedies imposed for future incidents of noncompliance. 15 
The findings are also used as the basis for Medicare fraud and abuse 
cases that lead to stiff fines, resulting in financial harm.16 Addition-
ally, once a nursing home is granted a hearing, the hearing is often 
limited to in-person cross-examination even though there are issues of 
material fact in dispute. 17 This practice of denying a full evidentiary 
hearing to nursing homes challenging the deprivation of property vio-
11 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council), 529 U.S. 1 
(2000). 
12 The term "remedies" is a term of art created by Congress in the Medicare 
statute, which refers to the sanctions HHS imposes for violations of the Medicare Act. 
See H.R. REP. No. 100-39l(II), at 941-43 (2d Sess. 1987) (using the term to describe 
the sanctions HHS places on non-complying nursing homes). Remedies that may be 
imposed includes directed plan of correction, state monitoring, directed in-service 
training, denial of payment for new admissions, denial of payment for all Medicare 
patients, a civil money penalty, and temporary management. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404. 
13 See 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(l3). This section was originally designated as § 
498.3(b)(12) until 2001. See 65 Fed. Reg. 18549 (Apr. 7, 2000). 
14 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (final determination) (the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed nursing 
home appeal challenging findings of noncompliance because there was allegedly no 
harm). 
15 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(c)(2), 488.438(±)(1), (3). 
16 Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 
12 J. L. & POL'Y 55, 95-98 (2003). 
17 See DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) (initial 
pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); DAB No. C-
05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (peti-
tioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
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lates the Constitution, the AP A, and the Medicare Act, 18 but nursing 
homes are barred from seeking federal review. 
The Due Process Clause provides individuals with a right to the 
procedure of a hearing when deprived of a constitutionally protected 
right. 19 With the passage of the AP A, these procedural due process 
standards have been routinely applied to federal administrative agen-
cies. 20 The AP A grants individuals a full evidentiary hearing on the 
record to challenge the deprivation of liberty or property.21 A full evi-
dentiary hearing includes a right to counsel, in-person witness testi-
mony, and an impartial decision-maker. 22 These rights to a hearing 
remain subordinate to each agency's governing statute, which often 
limit the structure of the hearing process and the right to federal re-
view.23 For instance, the Medicare Act mandates that HHS provide 
nursing homes with a hearing to appeal findings of alleged noncom-
pliance with the Medicare regulations.24 The Medicare regulations 
further provide nursing homes with the right to a full evidentiary hear-
ing when a nursing home is dissatisfied with any finding of noncom-
pliance with the Medicare regulations.25 Nursing homes challenging 
noncot;npliance findings are not provided with a full evidentiary hear-
ing as required by the Constitution, the AP A, and the Medicare Act 
and regulations. Notwithstanding this violation, nursing homes have 
no means to address this violation because they are barred from seek-
ing federal review. 
The Social Security Act prohibits federal review of a case until 
HHS reviews the case and issues a final ruling. 26 This prohibition ap-
plies to all cases arising under the Social Security Act and the Medi-
care Act. 27 The Supreme Court applied this prohibition to Medicare 
18 See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1346 (West 2005). 
19 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319 
(stating that the Due Process Clause provides individuals with a right to a hearing 
when they are being deprived of a constitutionally protected right). 
20 Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
21 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 2005). 
22 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 556-57. 
23 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 556-57. For instance, the requirement of exhausting all 
administrative remedies before bringing a case in federal court only applies when 
provided by an agency's governing statute. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 
(1993). 
24 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1395cc(h)(l)(A) (West 2005). 
25 The right to a hearing is provided by 42 C.F.R. § 488.330(e)(3) (2005). 
The right to a full evidentiary hearing is provided for by 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-
66. 
26 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g)-(h) (West 2005). 
27 42 U.S.C. § l395cc(h)(l)(A) incorporates §§ 405(g) and (h) into the nurs-
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compliance hearings in Ill. Counci/.28 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the prohibition barred federal review of nursing home challenges to 
Medicare compliance findings until the case had been presented to 
HHS and a final ruling had been issued.29 The Court ruled in this 
manner because the Secretary ofHHS (Secretaryi0 asserted that nurs-
ing homes were afforded the right to procedural due process protec-
tions, which included the right of any dissatisfied nursing home to a 
full evidentiary hearing to challenge any findings ofnoncompliance.31 
Notwithstanding the assertions made in Ill. Council, HHS has not 
provided any of the procedural due process rights that the Court relied 
upon in its ruling in Ill. Counci/.32 When no remedy is imposed, the 
case is summarily dismissed without a final ruling. 33 Hence, as a prac-
tical matter it is impossible for nursing homes to gain access to federal 
review ~o challenge this constitutional issue because they never fulfill 
the finality requirement of the Social Security Act. Because nursing 
homes never obtain a final ruling if no remedy is imposed, the Su-
preme Court's decision requiring a fmal decision before federal re-
view has effectively denied nursing homes procedural due process to 
challenge any issue, including constitutional issues.34 
ing home hearing procedure. This bar is understandable when a nursing home is chal-
lenging the Medicare regulations, which the Secretary has the authority to change. 
However, when the channeling provision limits the federal review of constitutional 
challenges to the Medicare Act, the Secretary's review of the issue is meaningless 
because the Secretary has no authority to issue a ruling or even make changes to the 
Medicare Act. 
28 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. I (2000). 
29 Jd at20. 
30 At the time of the case the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Sec-
retary), was Donna Shalala. 
31 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. I, 20 (2000). 
32 In fact, this proposition was codified in the Code of Federal Regulations in 
1996, four years before the Supreme Court heard and issued its ruling in Ill. Council. 
Provider Appeals: Technical Amendments, 61 Fed. Reg. 32347, 32348-32349 (June 
24, 1996)(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.153(b)(2003)). 
33 The ALJs summarily dismiss nursing home appeals in Medicare noncom-
pliance cases when HHS has not imposed a remedy. See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB 
No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1997) (fmal determination); Jacinto City 
Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage 
Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); 
Lutheran Home - Caledonia, DAB No. CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
2000) (initial determination); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakeland Lodge Nursing 
Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care 
Ctr., DAB No. CRI029 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brigh-
ton, DAB No. CRI104 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Manorcare Health 
Servs. Sandia, DAB No. CRI255 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004). 
34 This argument was raised by the Illinois Council on Long Term Care, but 
728 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 16:723 
Furthermore, since Ill. Council, many of the Adininistrative Law 
Judges (ALJs) have arbitrarily reduced the full evidentiary hearing 
process35 to direct testimony through submission of affidavits and in-
person cross-examination of witnesses.36 Consequently, even if a 
nursing home is afforded a right to a hearing HHS still violates the 
law by not providing the procedures mandated by the AP A,37 and the 
Medicare Act38 and regulations.39 The abrogation of nursing homes' 
procedural due process rights has pushed the industry to near col-
lapse.40 For instance, not only do alleged violations of Medicare regu-
the Court dismissed these claims as too speculative. Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 20. 
35 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-66 (2005). See also Qep't Appeals Board, 
Civil Remedies Division, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Procedures (providing 
hearing procedures for the Civil Remedies Division of the DAB) (on file with author). 
36 Compare Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing 
with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Serv~. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
37 The AP A provides for a full evidentiary hearing once the statute mandates 
that a hearing be held on the record. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 2005). 
38 The Medicare Act grants nursing homes the right to a hearing to the same 
extent as 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(h)(l)(A) (West -2005). Sec-
tion 405(b)(l) of the Medicare Act provides individuals "reasonable notice and op-
portunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held, shall, 
on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the Com-
missioner's findings of fact and such decision .... In the course of any hearing, inves-
tigation, or other proceeding, the Commissioner may administer oaths and affirma-
tions, examine witnesses and receive evidence." 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b)(l) (West 
2005). 
39 At the hearing, the ALJs must review in detail all the "matters at issue, and 
receive[ ] in evidence the testimony of witnesses and any documents that are relevant 
and material." 42 C.F.R. § 498.60. At the hearing each party is required to examine 
their own witness and make the witness available for cross-examination. 42 C.F.R. § 
498.62. A full evidentiary hearing is held unless there are no material issues in dispute 
or the nursing home requests a waiver for the hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 498.66. 
40 Providing care for the elderly in nursing homes is an enormous cost that 
''bankrupt all but the wealthiest in nursing homes." 133 CoNG. REc. S57l4-02 (1987). 
In 1987, the General Accounting Office reported that the federal government had not 
fulfilled its statutory assurances of reimbursing nursing homes at a level to provide 
high quality care. 133 CoNG. REc. 85714-02. This is further exacerbated by nursing 
homes losing residents due to public noncompliance fmdings and legal fees to chal-
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lations serve as the basis for the imposition of future remedies and 
Medicare fraud and abuse,41 but also insurance companies use these 
findings in determining yearly insurance premiums for nursing 
homes.42 Therefore, procedural due process rights, or lack thereof, 
afforded nursing homes during hearings to challenge alleged viola-
tions of the Medicare regulations are paramount to a nursing home's 
continued operation. In order to comply with traditional notions of 
procedural due process required by the Constitution, the AP A, and the 
Medicare Act and regulations, this article argues that HHS must pro-
vide nursing homes with hearing rights in all cases and allow them to 
bypass the administrative system if the only challenge concerns con-
stitutional or statutory procedures. This is significant because the de-
nial of a nursing home's due process rights in administrative hearings 
is emblematic ofthe federal administrative agency system.43 
This article will examine the failure of HHS to provide nursing 
homes with procedural due process rights in light of the Supreme 
Court decision in Ill. Council. Part I will define the current structure 
and problem with Medicare compliance hearings, while Part II briefly 
traces the right to procedural due process rights in federal administra-
tive agency and Medicare compliance hearings. Part III reviews the 
Social Security Act's bar to federal review and the application of this 
lenge all the resulting claims from these umeviewable findings. 
41 Krause, supra note 16, at 95-98. 
42 Currently in many states, such as Texas, Florida and Illinois there is an 
insurance crisis for nursing homes. Many nursing homes are forced- to operate without 
insurance because insurance companies are unwilling to offer nursing homes with less 
than perfect compliance histories reasonable insurance rates. See Kendall Anderson, 
Nursing Homes Pay Premium to Survive: Soaring Liability Costs Blamed for Closure 
of Nonprofit Care Centers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2002, at 21A. Liability 
insurance rates, tied to litigation costs and the quality of care, have increased on aver-
age 1,000 percent since 1998. Id 
43 Throughout the years there have been many actions challenging the denial 
of due process rights in agency hearings conducted by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Services. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 
(1999) {ruling that the exclusive clause of the illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) barred federal review of claims and causes 
originating from the Attorney General's action to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 
479 (1991) (holding that individuals challenging the Immigration and Naturalization 
Services administration of the Special Agricultural Workers provisions of the Immi-
gration Reform Control Act to determine the adjustment status of immigrants could 
be reviewed in federal court based on federal question jurisdiction to evaluate issues 
concerning the Due Process Clause, even though the statute barred federal question 
jurisdiction). See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530-31 (2004) {ruling that pro-
cedural due process mandates that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant be 
granted a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his containment). 
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bar to Medicare compliance hearings in the pivotal case of Ill. Coun-
cil. The problems with the case and possible solutions to rectify these 
problems are addressed in Part IV. 
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN MEDICARE 
COMPLIANCE HEARINGS: THE FIGHT FOR 
FAIRNESS 
The principal health care program funded and directly adminis-
tered by HHS is the Health Insurance for the Elderly and Disabled 
program, better known as Medicare.44 Medicare pays for sundry 
health care services provided to the elderly and consists of three parts: 
Part A (Hospital Insurance), Part B (Supplemental Medical Insur-
ance), and Part C (Medicare Managed Care).45 Part A covers nursing 
home care for persons over the age of sixty-five if they are placed in a 
nursing home within thirty days of being in the hospital for three or 
more days, and the placement is certified as medically necessary.46 
Medicare covers up to one hundred days of care received at a nursing 
home.47 
· To participate in the Medicare program, nursing homes must 
submit to a certification process, which includes a thorough inspection 
of the facility and an assessment of services being provided patients to 
ensure that they comply with the Medicare regulations.48 Once the 
nursing home is certified for participation in Medicare, HHS contracts 
with state health agencies49 to conduct annual re-certification inspec-
tions of each Medicare certified nursing home. 50 This re-certification 
44 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1395hhh (West 2005). 
Initially, the Office ofNursing Home Affairs, a division ofHHS, administered Medi-
care. IOM REPORT, supra note 10, at 244. In 1977, the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), 
was created to administer and regulate Medicare. See Pub. L. No. 95-135, 91 Stat. 
1166 (1977); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Statement of Organization, 
Functions and Delegations of Authority, 66 Fed. Reg. 35437 (July 5, 2001) (organiza-
tion and delegation of authority). 
45 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395c-1395w-29. 
46 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(i). 
47 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d(a)(2). However, Part A does not cover any nurs-
ing home services if the patient who requires skilled nursing or skilled rehabilitation 
services can receive these services on an outpatient basis. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k. 
48 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.3(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3) (2005). 
49 The State agency in Illinois responsible for conducting surveys of nursing 
homes is the Illinois Department of Public Health. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
45/1-109,45/3-212 (West 2004). 
50 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(a) (Survey Frequency). 
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process is called survey and certification.51 HHS aggressively regu-
lates the nursing home industry through its survey and certification 
process, citing nursing homes for noncompliance with the Medicare 
regulations. 52 Although the Medicare Act provides nursing homes 
with a right to a full evidentiary hearing, HHS is limiting the access of 
nursing homes to full evidentiary hearings. 
A. Structure ofMedicare Compliance Hearings 
Under the current survey and certification system, once a nursing 
home is certified to participate in Medicare, the home is visited every 
nine to fifteen months53 by a State health agency survey team54 com-
prised of nurses, nutritionists, social workers, and physical thera-
pists. 55 The team assesses whether the nursing home continues to be in 
compliance with the Medicare regulations.56 If the survey team finds 
the nursing home out of compliance with the Medicare regulations, it 
cites the facility for a deficienc/7 and assigns a scope and severity 
level to the deficiency based on the egregiousness of the offense. The 
scope is the number of residents affected and the severity level refers 
51 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300-488.335 (Subpart E - Survey & Certification of 
Long-Term Care Facilities). 
52 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Assuring Quality Care for 
Nursing Home Residents (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/ 
release.asp?Counte:r=384. 
53 This survey is called an annual standard survey. There are three other 
types of surveys: complaint, revisit, and extended standard survey. Although named 
differently, the appeals for each survey are the same. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.308(a)-(e) 
(2005). 
54 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(a). . 
55 42 C.F.R. § 488.314. 
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(g)(2) (West 2005). The majority of nursing homes 
are also certified to participate in the Medicaid program. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.300. 
Thus, the survey team usually cites the nursing home for both Medicare and Medicaid 
violations. That is where the similarity ends. Unlike the Medicare hearing process, 
States usually provide nursing homes with an opportunity to refute survey findings 
during an informal hearing process. 42 C.F.R. § 488.33l(a)(l). In addition, the State 
affords the nursing home the opportunity to challenge all noncompliance findings in a 
full evidentiary hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 431.153(i). 
57 There are a total of 190 possible deficiencies divided into seventeen differ-
ent categories, for which HHS can cite a nursing home. See DEP'T OF REALm & 
HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF TilE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-02-01-00600, NURSING 
HOME DEFICIENCY TRENDS AND SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS CONSISTENCY 1 
(2003), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-02-0l-00600.pdf. Most defi-
ciencies are categorized into three main areas: quality of care (42 C.F.R. § 483.25); 
quality of life (42 C.F.R. § 483.15); and resident behavior and facility practice (42 
C.F.R. § 483.13). 
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to the seriousness of the harm. 58 The scope and severity of each defi-
ciency assigned is based on the matrix shown in Table 1. The team 
then denotes the seriousness of any alleged deficiencies by completing 
a Statement of Deficiencies (SOD) that sets out the letter in the matrix 
shown in Table 1 that corresponds to the appropriate scope and sever-
ity leve1.59 The SOD is then sent to HHS for approval.60 Once HHS 
approves the findings of noncompliance, it posts the findings on its 
website and notifies the nursing home ombudsman, the physicians and 
skilled nursing facility administration licensing board, and the State 
Medicaid fraud and abuse control units.61 
TABLE 162 
Severity Scope 
Isolated Pattern Widespread 
Immediate J K L 
Jeopardy 
Actual Hann G H I 
Potential for D E F 
mote than mini-
mal harm, but not 
immediate 
jeopardy 
No actual harm A B c 
with a potential 
for minimal harm 
58 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b). The scope of the deficiency means whether the 
deficiency was isolated, constituted a pattern of behavior, or was widespread. See 42 
C.F.R. § 488.404(b)(2). The severity is whether a facility's deficiencies caused: no 
actual harm with a potential for minimal harm; no actual harm with a potential for 
more than minimal harm, but not immediate jeopardy; actual harm that is not imme-
diate jeopardy; or immediate jeopardy to a resident's health or safety. See 42 C.F.R. § 
488.404(b)(l). 
59 The Statement of Deficiencies (SOD) details the nursing home's violations 
of the Medicare regulations and factual incidents to support these allegations. See 42 
C.F.R. § 488.402(f)(l). The SOD is issued prior to a nursing home requesting a hear-
ing. 42 C.F.R. § 488.18(b)(l). 
60 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.330(d), 488.402(f)(l). 
61 42 U.S.C.A. § l395i-3(g)(5). The information remains posted until the 
next annual survey is conducted. 
62 LISA MATTHEWS-MARTINET. AL, AM. HEALTH CARE ASSOC., COMPARING 
NURSING HOME QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION OF THE BASIC METHOD 
IN NURSING HOME RANKING SYSTEMS 3 (2003), available at http://www.ahca.org/ 
research/NHC _Note_ EvalNHRatingSystems _Final_ 20030922.pdf. 
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Upon approval from HHS, the State agency sends a copy of the 
SOD to the offending nursing home along with a letter noting all the 
remedies imposed.63 Remedies that may be imposed include a directed 
plan of correction, state monitoring, directed in-service training, 
denial of payment for new admissions, denial of payment for all 
Medicare patients, a civil money penalty from $50 to $10,000, and 
temporary management. 64 HHS also sends the nursing home a letter 
confirming the imposition of a remedy and the duration of each 
imposed remedy.65 If the nursing home decides to appeal the alleged 
noncompliance findings, it bears the burden of proof and must file a 
separate hearing request within sixty days from the date of the state's 
and HHS's letter.66 The hearing request is sent to HHS's judicial 
board, and then assigned to a specific ALJ.67 The hearing process 
varies significantly based on which of the eight ALJs is presiding over 
the case;68 hearings can last from one to five days and include only 
cross-examination testimony.69 Once the ALJ issues a ruling, the 
63 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.18(b)(l), 488.402(f)(2). 
64 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.406, 488.408(a)(2). A nursing home is out of com-
pliance with the Medicare regulations if the deficiency creates more than a potential 
for causing minimal harm. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301. Remedies are only imposed if a 
nursing home is not in substantial compliance with the Medicare regulations. 42 
C.F.R. § 488.400. 
65 42 C.F.R. § 488.402. 
66 42 C.F.R. § 498.82. Usually to preserve its hearing rights, nursing homes 
must file an appeal to each letter it receives that discusses the imposition of remedies 
even if the information is duplicated. See Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. 
Thompson, No. 03 Civ.260(NRB), 2004 WL 434434 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 04-2586-
CV, 2005 WL 3076899 (2d Cir. 2005). 
67 42 C.F.R. § 498.44. 
68 There are eight HHS ALJs to cover all of the nursing homes cases nation-
wide. The Chief ALJ is Silva and he serves with the following ALJs in order of sen-
iority: Kessel, Hughes, Anglada, Montano, Smith, Sickendick, and Blair. U.S. Dep't 
of Health & Humans Servs., Administrative Law Judges, http://www.hhs.gov/dab/ 
judges.htrnl (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). 
69 Compare Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing 
with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
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nursing home has sixty days to appeal the decision to the 
Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), the appeallate body of HHS.70 
After receiving a ruling from the DAB, the nursing home may appeal 
the case to federal court. This whole hearing process usually takes a 
number of years to reach the federallevel. 71 
B. The Problem: Lack of Procedural Due Process 
The Medicare Act provides individuals dissatisfied with the non-
compliance findings of the Secretary with "reasonable notice and op-
portunity for a hearing with respect to such decision .... In the course 
of any hearing, investigation, or other proceeding, the Commissioner72 
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and re-
ceive evidence."73 This section has been interpreted to mean that nurs-
ing homes dissatisfied with findings of noncompliance have a right to 
a hearing. 74 This article will show, however, that the agency's current 
practices fall short of this ideal. 
If HHS fails to impose or rescinds the remedies imposed for a 
nursing home's alleged noncompliance, nursing homes do not have a 
right to a hearing even though the findings of noncompliance are not 
rescinded, 75 nor removed from the HHS website, 76 and are the basis 
70 42 C.P.R. § 498.80. 
71 See Lutheran Home -Caledonia, DAB No. CR674 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. 
CR691 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination). 
72 Under the Medicare Act, the Secretary of HHS was inserted to replace the 
term Commissioner. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(h)(1)(A) (West 2005). 
73 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b) (West 2005). Section 1395cc(h)(1)(A) of the Medi-
care Act incorporates sections 405(b ), (g), and (h). The Medicare Act grants nursing 
homes the right to a hearing to the same extent as 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), (g). See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(b)(l)(A). 
74 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council), 529 U.S. 1, 
20 (2000). 
75 See Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA, CR 424 (1996), a.ff'd, DAB No. 1607 
(1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Center v. HCFA, CR627 (1999); Heritage Manor of 
Franklinton v. HCFA, CR666 (2002); Lutheran Home- Caledonia v. HCFA, CR 674 
(2000), a.ff'd, DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Center v. HCFA, CR 
691 (2000), ajf'd, DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Center v. HCFA, 
CR893 (2002); Southwood Care Center v. CMS, CR1029 (2003); Highlands at Brigh-
ton v. CMS, CR1104 (2003); Manor Care Health Services Sandia v. CMS, CR1255 
(2004). 
76 See Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA, CR 424 (1996), a.ff'd, DAB No. 1607 
(1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Center v. HCFA, CR627 (1999); Heritage Manor of 
Franklinton v. HCFA, CR666 (2002); Lutheran Home- Caledonia v. HCFA, CR 674 
(2000), a.ff'd, DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Center v. HCFA, CR 
691 (2000), a.ff'd, DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Center v. HCFA, 
CR893 (2002); Southwood Care Center v. CMS, CR1 029 (2003); Highlands at Brigh-
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for the impos1t10n of remedies for future incidents of 
noncompliance. 77 In addition, HHS has consistently disregarded 
nursing homes' rights to a full evidentiary hearing as required by the 
Medicare regulations.78 Many of the ALJs have drastically reduced 
the full evidentiary hearing process to direct testimony through 
submission of affidavit and in-person cross-examination of witnesses. 
The ALJs have made these arbitrary changes without any change in 
the hearing procedures or regulations.79 As a result of these changes, 
nursing homes have been left without an opportunity to be heard in 
the agency proceeding and in federal court before the loss of their 
property, Medicare payments.80 This a violation of the letter and spirit 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the AP A, and the 
Medicare Act and regulations that guarantees a right to process before 
the loss of property. 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
The cornerstone of the American justice system, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, guarantees 
that no person will "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
ton v. CMS, CRI104 (2003); Manor Care Health Services Sandia v. CMS, CR1255 
(2004). 
77 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(c)(2), 488.438(t)(l) and (3) (2003). 
78 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-498.66 (2003). 
79 See Dep't Appeals Board, Civil Remedies Division, Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., Procedures (providing hearing procedures for the Civil Remedies 
Division of the DAB) (on file with author). Compare Initial Hearing Orders that 
provide a full evidentiary hearing with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-
438 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Servs. 2002) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), DAB No. C-05-404 (Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-
06-189 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (peti-
tioner's name concealed) (on file with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require 
written direct testimony in lieu of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 2004) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name con-
cealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author). 
80 No federal court has ruled that Medicare payments constitute property; 
however, most courts ignore this issue and simply review the merits of the case. See 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 {1976); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); 
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Michigan 
Ass'n of Homes & Servs.for the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Jordan Hasp., Inc. v. Shalala, 276 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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due process of law."81 Individuals deprived of property must be 
granted procedural due process, which entails a hearing.82 Procedural 
due process rights are an integral part of a full and fair hearing in fed-
eral and state courts.83 Due Process also applies to the administrative 
agency adjudicative system. Even though few administrative law dis-
putes are resolved using the Due Process Clause, the procedural re-
quirements granted during administrative hearings is determined by 
courts,84 Congress, and the administrative agency's understanding of 
procedural Due Process.85 Over the years, the interpretation of Due 
Process as applied to administrative agency hearings has evolved to 
prevent the probability of an erroneous deprivation of property. 86 
Congress tried to further standardize the requirements of 
procedural due process granted by federal administrative agencies 
with the passage of the AP A. 87 Unfortunately, individuals are not 
always granted these due process rights when challenging the 
deprivation of liberty or property by federal administrative agencies. 88 
The abrogation of these protections during federal administrative 
agency adjudications has created an eternal tension between the 
agencies, the individuals regulated by the agencies, and the federal 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § 1. Businesses (i.e. corporations) are 
considered persons under the law and thus are guaranteed due process under the law. 
County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
82 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
83 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 556 (West 2005); CoMM. ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, 
S. Doc. No. 8 (1940). 
84 In Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court noted that when "presented 
with both statutory and constitutional grounds to support relief requested usually 
should pass on the statutory claim before considering the constitutional question." 
Califano, 442 U.S. 682, 692-693 (1979). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been 
inconsistent in its application of this rule as shown by its discussion of the Due Proc-
ess Clause in Califano even though it noted that the case could be resolved based on 
the statute. !d. at 693 and 696. 
85 RICHARD PIERCE, JR., ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 231 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
86 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) ("[p]rocedural due 
process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the 
mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property'' (citing Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978))). See also Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 (noting "the 
importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed" and empha-
sizing that "the right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense that it does 
not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions"). 
87 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950) (citing S. 5154, 
70th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1929)). 
88 Richard I. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1999 (1996). 
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courts.89 This tension pervades the lives of every individual and 
business as federal administrative agencies, such as HHS, govern vital 
aspects of all daily living. 
A. Procedural Due Process under the Constitution 
The amount of procedural due process individuals are guaranteed 
under the Fifth Amendment when challenging the deprivation of 
property by Federal administrative agencies centers on two questions: 
(1) When is due process required?; and (2) What process is due? The 
Supreme Court answered these questions in the landmark cases Gold-
berg v. Kell/0 and Mathews v. Eldridge.91 
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court ruled that welfare recipients' 
right to statutorily granted payments constituted property.92 The dep-
rivation of this property right required the government to provide pro-
cedural due process rights.93 The Court further ruled that due process 
required welfare recipients to be provided with a full hearing before 
their welfare payments were terminated.94 The Court further stated 
that Congress usually incorporates some form of review in the statutes 
that grant administrative agencies authority to regulate individuals.95 
Thus, administrative agencies are required to provide individuals with 
89 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding that 
individuals challenging the Immigration and Naturalization Services adrrrinistration of 
the Special Agricultural Workers provisions of the Immigration Reform Control Act 
to determine the adjustment status of immigrants could be reviewed in federal court 
based on federal question jurisdiction to evaluate issues concerning the Due Process 
Clause, even though the statute barred federal question jurisdiction). 
90 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
91 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
92 The recipients in this case were receiving financial aid under the auspices 
of the federal assistance program, Aid to Farrrilies with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
or under New York State's general Home Relief Program. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255-
56. Two suits were brought and consolidated in the District Court. !d. at 257. There 
were twenty named plaintiffs, fourteen of which had been or were about to be cut off 
from AFDC and six from Home Relief. !d. During the course of litigation most, 
though not all, of the plaintiffs received a fair hearing or were restored to the roles 
without a hearing. The case continued because the questions raised by the plaintiffs 
have still not been addressed even though their assistance has been restored. !d. at 256 
n.2. 
93 !d. at 260-61. 
94 !d. at 260 
95 !d. at 262. For example, the Medicare Act grants beneficiaries, physicians, 
and nursing homes the right to review most agency actions. Although the extent of the 
right to review under Medicare varies, the right of review is triggered when HHS 
initiates an action to deprive an individual or entity of its Medicare payments. Once 
the right is triggered, the issue becomes what procedures must be part of the review. It 
is unclear what procedures, such as witness testimony, must be part of the review. 
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a right to review when action by an agency causes a deprivation of 
property.96 However, in Eldridge,97 the Supreme Court fashioned a 
rule used to determine what process is due, making the process com-
mensurate to the harm suffered from the deprivation of property. 
In Eldridge, Mr. Eldridge, a Social Security recipient, challenged 
HHS's decision to revoke his disability benefits prior to providing an 
evidentiary hearing.98 Although HHS did not provide a pre-
termination hearing, it had arrived at this decision based on a thorough 
standard process.99 Eldridge's condition was verified annually by a 
state agency. 100 The state sent Eldridge's physician a questionnaire 
concerning Eldridge's disability. 101 Due to the answers on this ques-
tionnaire and a review of his condition by agency physicians, the state 
agency determined that Eldridge's disability had ceased. 102 Eldridge 
was informed that his benefits would be terminated and he was pro-
vided with an opportunity to review the evidence in his case file. 103 
Eldridge submitted a letter noting that the physicians were mis-
taken about his condition and that a resolution of this mistake made 
him still disabled. 104 The state agency reviewed Eldridge's letter and 
ruled that he was no longer disabled. 105 The agency then submitted its 
findings to HHS, which accepted the agency's finding. 106 HHS sent a 
letter to Eldridge notifying him that he could seek reconsideration by 
96 !d. at 270. 
97 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
98 !d. at 326. The Supreme Court noted that the Secretary could not resolve 
the matter because it arose under constitutional issues and thus, the Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the issue. Id. at 329-30. This is important because the year 
before it decided Mr. Eldridge's case, the Court ruled in Weinberger v. Salfi that 
federal courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over cases arising from Social 
Security claims unless the case was first presented to HHS and the Secretary issued a 
final ruling. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975). The Weinberger deci-
sion clearly applied to Eldridge because Mr. Eldridge's claims arose under Social 
Security and were presented in federal court before the Secretary issued a final ruling. 
Thus, based on the subject matter jurisdiction bar applied in Salfi, Eldridge should 
never have been decided because Eldridge did not present his case to HHS and had 
not received a final ruling. The author is in the process of drafting an article to discuss 
why Eldridge should never have been decided because of the subject matter jurisdic-
tion bar. 
99 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323-34. 
100 !d. at 337. 
101 !d. at 338. 
102 !d. 
103 !d. 
104 !d. at 339. 
105 !d. at 339. 
106 !d. at 340. 
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the state agency. 107 HHS would then review the decision and notify 
Eldridge of his right to an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. 108 If 
there was an adverse decision, then Eldridge could request discretion-
ary review by the Appeals Court and then obtain judicial review. 109 
After receiving the agency's fmdings, Eldridge filed a claim in federal 
court instead of submitting his claim for reconsideration. 110 
In reviewing Eldridge's claim, the Supreme Court noted that due 
process was flexible and only called for procedural protections as de-
manded by the particular situation.111 The hearing procedure is spe-
cific to the circumstances of the parties, but must always provide the 
parties with a meaningful opportunity to present their case. 112 The 
process due was dictated by three factors: (1) the private interest that 
was affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest and the reduction of risk, if any, from the addition 
ofprocedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest including 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedures would entail. 113 
In applying these factors to Eldridge's case, the Court ruled that a 
post-enforcement hearing satisfied the requirements of procedural due 
process. 114 The Court found that Mr. Eldridge's interest in uninter-
rupted disability payments was negligible compared with the govern-
ment's interest in avoiding the administrative cost and the burden of 
providing an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of bene-
fits.115 Additionally, the Court ruled that there was minimal risk of 
erroneous deprivation that would not be reduced by additional proce-
dural safeguards.116 The Court found that the procedures used byHHS 
were fair and reliable117 and that most of the initial termination deci-
sions were upheld after a hearing.118 Hence, the Court ruled that the 
post-termination hearing fulfilled the requirements of due process. 119 
107 Jd at 325. 
108 Id at 324. 
109 Id at 338-39. 
110 Id at 324-25. 
111 Id at 334. 
112 Id at 349. 
113 Id at 335. 
114 Id at 349. 
115 Id at 343. 
116 Id. 
117 Id at 345. 
118 Id at 347. 
119 In Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court modified Eldridge by limiting 
the right to full evidentiary hearing to matters where there are material issues of fact 
in dispute that create a threat of erroneous deprivation of property. Califano, 442 U.S. 
at 696. The ·Califano case involved disabled social security beneficiaries seeking a 
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Due process is an integral part of the hearing process in federal 
administration adjudications. According to the Supreme Court, "The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'120 Procedural 
due process grants individuals the right to some type of hearing when 
deprived of property. 121 The type of hearing is dependent on the pos-
sibility of erroneous deprivation of property and balancing the inter-
ests of the individual and the government. 122 To ascertain whether the 
type of hearing will cause an erroneous deprivation of property, one 
must review the AP A, the agency's governing statute, regulations, and 
current process. The AP A provides a right to a full evidentiary hearing 
and details what should be included in this type of hearing. 123 Con-
gress enacted the AP A tb instill a sense of fairness and impartiality 
into federal administrative agency hearings. Although Congress made 
the AP A subordinate to the agency's governing statute, it illustrates 
Congress' intent to provide individuals with procedural due process 
rights when challenging the actions of federal administrative agencies. 
B. The Administrative Procedure Act-Fairness and Due Process in 
Administrative Agency Hearings 
As early as the 1920s, Congress began delegating broad powers to 
federal administrative agencies to protect the health, safety and wel-
fare of the public, but the Supreme Court regularly overturned these 
delegations. 124 After 1935, the Supreme Court upheld broad Congres-
sional delegation of power to federal administrative agencies, culmi-
hearing before HHS recouped overpayments. Id. at 684-685. The Supreme Court 
ruled that when recipients requested a waiver regarding the factual determination of 
fault to prevent HHS' recoupment of overpayments, the recipients were guaranteed a 
right to a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at 696. This full evidentiary hearing include in-
person witness testimony and cross-examination because "the Secretary could mis-
judge a number of cases" causing erroneous deprivation of social security payments. 
Id. at 697. In the case of nursing homes there are always issues of material fact in 
dispute. Thus, this limitation does not affect the nursing homes claim for a full evi-
dentiary hearing. 
120 Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
121 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). 
122 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
123 See infra Part LB. 
124 See Panama Refming Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (ruling that Con-
gressional delegation of power to President under National Industrial Recovery Act to 
limit the interstate transportation of petroleum was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power); A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
(ruling that Congressional delegation of power to President under National Industrial 
Recovery Act to limit the interstate transportation of petroleum was an unconstitu-
tional delegation oflegislative power). 
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nating in several cases in which the Court upheld delegation of power 
to agencies with little to no standards. 125 With the proliferation of fed-
eral administrative agencies, Congress became concerned with the 
potential for administrative bias in federal administrative hearings 
because agencies were granted significant discretion in their hearing 
procedures. 126 Because the agency served as the investigator, the 
prosecutor, and the judge, Congress questioned whether the agency 
could be genuinely impartial. 127 There were a series of bills introduced 
in Congress in the 1930s and 1940s aimed at correcting the problems 
with the administrative review process. 128 
In 193 7, President Roosevelt also became concerned with the 
fairness of the administrative review process and created the Commit-
tee on Administrative Management. 129 Two years later, the President 
also directed the Attorney General to establish a new "committee of 
eminent lawyers, jurists, scholars, and administrators to review the 
entire administrative process in the various departments of the execu-
tive Government and to recommend improvements, including the 
suggestion of any needed legislation."130 Before the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee Report was issued, Congress passed the Walter-
125 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding the broad 
delegation of power to the Price Administrator to regulate commodity pricing); Lich-
ter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (upholding a statute giving the executive 
branch the power to recover profits from war contracts deemed "excessive" without 
defining what constituted "excessive"); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) 
(upholding Congressional delegation of power to the Federal Loan Bank Board to 
issue regulation for when a conservator could be appointed to take over ·a misman-
aged federal savings and loan association). The Court's decisions in these cases, 
leading to the independence of agencies from executive, legislative, and judicial con-
trols, solidified the place of the federal administrative agency as the "fourth branch" 
of the federal government. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 13 (4th ed. 2002). 
126 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950) (citing S. 5154, 
70th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1929)). 
127 !d. 
128 S. 1835, 73rd Cong. (1933); S. 3787, 74th Cong. (1936); S. 3676, 75th 
Cong. (1938); H.R. 4235, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R. 4236, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R. 
6324, 76th Cong. (1939); S. 915, 76th Cong. (1939); S. 916, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R. 
1203, 79th Cong. (1945); S. 7, 79th Cong. (1945); H.R. 4314, 78th Cong. (1944); 
H.R. 5081, 78th Cong. (1944); H.R. 5237, 78th Cong. (1944); S. 2030, 78th Cong. 
(1944); H.R. 3464, 77th Cong. (1941); H.R. 4238, 77th Cong. (1941); H.R. 4782, 
77th Cong. (1941); S. 674, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 675, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 918, 
77th Cong. (1941). 
129 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1937). 
130 The quoted statement is from President Roosevelt's message to Congress 
on December 18, 1940, vetoing the Walter-Logan Act of 1940. 86 CONG. REc. 13942-
3 (1940), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940). 
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Logan bill that standardized the administrative review process. The 
Walter-Logan bill provided for a standard hearing process that in-
cluded a right to appeal agency actions in writing, a right to a hearing 
before a three-panel board, a right to call witnesses and compel docu-
ments, and a right to appeal the decision to the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeal. 131 President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, 132 acknowledging the 
need for reform, but delaying his decision until the Attorney General's 
Committee Report was issued. 133 
To instill a sense of fairness and eradicate the bias and arbitrary 
nature of agency hearings, the Attorney General's Committee Report 
(the Report) recommended that agencies completely separate adjudi-
cation functions and persop.nel from those investigating and prosecut-
ing claims. 134 However, in comparison to the Walter-Logan bill, the 
Report provided generalized guidelines for attaining these goals rather 
than providing specific procedures. Congress used the Report to craft 
the bill that was later entitled the Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946.135 Even though the broad language in the Report allowed the 
agency more flexibility in fulfilling the requirements of fairness, the 
AP A afforded the right to some procedural safeguards on the agency 
level once the agency's governing statute granted hearing rights. 136 
Most significantly, section 554 of the AP A provides hearing rights in 
"every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on 
the record. " 137 
This section explicitly grants a right to a full evidentiary hearing 
on the record. Furthermore, section 556(d) of the APA states that: 
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the 
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of 
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. . . . A 
party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or 
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to 
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full 
and true disclosure of the facts. 138 
131 86 CONG. REc. 12901, 13674-75 (1940). 
132 H.R. 6324, S. 915. See also 86 CONG. REc. 13942-3 (1940), reprinted in 
H.R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940). 
133 86 CONG. REc. 13943 (1940). 
134 COMM. ADMIN. PROCEDURE, supra note 83. 
135 See generally S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945). 
136 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 2005). 
137 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (emphasis added). 
138 5 U.S.C.A. § 556. 
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This section explicitly limits the intake of evidence to that which is 
material to the case and grants individuals challenging agency actions 
the right to an oral hearing. In addition, Congress tried to provide 
safeguards in the AP A by making it clear that all agency decisions 
were reviewable by the federal courts unless Congress clearly with-
held that right. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated: 
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never 
been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of 
its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of 
authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy 
could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in ef-
fect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administra-
tive officer or board. 139 
The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary further 
said that there should be judicial review and stressed that when that 
review is limited the intent should be clear. 140 Although Congress 
enacted the AP A to address issues of fairness in the administrative 
hearing process, 141 these rights to a hearing remain subordinate to 
each agency's governing statute/42 which often limits the structure of 
the hearing process and the right to federal review. 143 
Based on the Supreme Court's rulings in Goldberg and Eldridge, 
procedural due process guarantees an individual deprived of property 
a right to a hearing.144 The type of hearing depends on the agency's 
governing statute and regulations and balancing the individual's inter-
est against the government's interest. 145 If the statute grants a hearing 
on the record, the AP A requires that the individual. be granted a full 
evidentiary hearing including witness testimony. The Medicare Act 
139 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986) 
(citing S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
140 H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 41 (1946). 
141 Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). See also COMM. ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE, supra note 83. 
142 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 702, 704. 
143 See Reno v. A.m.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) 
(ruling that the exclusive clause of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) barred federal review of claims and causes 
originating from the 'Attorney General's action to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders). 
144 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 u.s. 319, 343 (1976). 
145 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340-43. 
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grants nursing homes a right to a hearing on the record. 146 The stmc-
ture of nursing home hearings has always been connected to the sever-
ity of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance. Therefore, a review 
of the evolution of the entire regulatory system governing nursing 
home participation in the Medicare Program is necessary to under-
stand what constitutes a hearing on the record under the Medicare Act. 
C. Procedural Due Process under the Medicare Act and Regulations 
When Congress enacted the Medicare Act, 147 it imposed strict 
health and safety standards on nursing home care. 148 Initially, the 
Medicare standards were so severe that only about 10 percent of the 
6,000 nursing homes that applied to participate in the program 
achieved full compliance. 149 Another 50 percent were allowed to par-
ticipate in the program for being in "substantial compliance" with the 
Medicare standards. 150 Therefore, the purpose of the first nursing 
home enforcement standards was to "allow some substandard facili-
ties to participate in the [Medicare] program while encouraging them 
to achieve compliance, rather than to bar such facilities until they 
were in compliance."151 Thus, nursing homes did not need to request a 
hearing because there was no adversarial system. 
Congress amended the Medicare program in 1967, creating less 
rigorous regulatory standards for participation.152 Without these 
changes people who needed nursing care would have been left with no 
option for care. 153 The regulatory standards were again revised in 
1974.154 Under these new regulations, if a facility was found in viola-
tion of the regulations, HHS required the states to try to resolve the 
146 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(c)(2) (West 2005). 
147 Medicaid is also a federally funded program; however, the States adminis-
ter this p,rogram. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 2005). 
48 IOM REPORT, supra note l 0, at 241. 
149 ld 
150 ld at 148, 233. 
151 ld at 148. 
152 Id See also Assistance in Form of Institutional Services in Intermediate 
Care Facilities, 33 Fed. Reg. 12925 (Sept. 12, 1968); Institutional Services in Inter-
mediate Care Facilities, 34 Fed. Reg. 9782-9784 (June 24, 1969) 
153 ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: 
A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 140 (Transaction Publishers 2003) (1940). 
154 Skilled Nursing Facilities, 39 Fed. Reg. 2238-2257 (Jan. 17, 1974). Under 
these regulations, HHS created an office in the federal regional offices to regulate and 
oversee state enforcement efforts of all long-term care facilities. IOM REPORT, supra 
note 10, at 245 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, many states chose not to implement 
or enforce these regulations. See id. at 244-45 (citation omitted). 
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case before reporting the problem to HHS or the police. 155 To resolve 
the case, states were mandated to send a notice of the violations to the 
facility and give the facility a thirty to sixty day grace period to cor-
rect violations. 156 If the facility failed to become compliant by the end 
of that time period, then and only then could the state impose the 
sanction of termination. 157 Prior to the termination of the facility, HHS 
did not make the findings of noncompliance public. Furthermore, with 
the imposition of this remedy, HHS granted the nursing home a full 
evidentiary hearing either before termination or within 120 days after 
the termination became effective. 158 In 1980, with the passage of the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (OBRA of 1980), Congress cre-
ated a new intermediate sanction, denial of payments for new Medi-
care admissions, and directed the Secretary to impose this remedy for 
nursing home deficiencies that did not cause immediate jeopardy159 to 
patients. 160 
Under this provision, a nursing home found out of compliance 
with the Medicare regulations was first given the opporttmity to de-
velop and implement a plan of correction for its deficiencies. 161 If the 
facility was unable to fulfill the requirements set forth in the plan of 
correction, the Secretary then had the right to impose the sanction of 
denial of payments for new admissions. 162 Congress created this new 
process and sanction because it would "serve to protect beneficiaries 
both by giving the skilled nursing facility an incentive to correct defi-
ciencies in a timely manner and by forestalling the need for traumatic 
155 Id. at 148. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 50 Fed. Reg. at 7191. From 1980 to 1984, there were 967 voluntary nurs-
ing home cancellations of participation in Medicare and only 159 terminations from 
the Medicare program. IOM REPORT, supra note 10, at 156-57. HHS used termination 
of a facility from Medicare as the last resort. HHS provided nursing homes with sev-
eral opportunities to become complaint through follow-up visits. ld. at 148. Even 
once a facility was de-certified from the program, HHS would allow the facility to re-
enter the Medicare program if the facility provided "reasonable assurance" that the 
deficiencies that caused termination would not be repeated. STEVENS & STEVENS, 
supra note 153, at 137-38. 
159 Immediate Jeopardy is defined as "a situation in which the provider's 
noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation has caused, or is likely 
to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident." See 42 C.F.R. § 
489.3 (2005). The States now have the authority to impose this remedy for Medicare 
violations. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.408. 
160 See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (OBRA of 1980), Pub. L. No. 
96-499, § 916, 94 Stat. 2599, 2623-2625 (1980). 
161 H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 56 (1980). 
162 H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 56. 
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transfers of large numbers of patients during the time needed im-
provements are being made in the facility." 163 Congress also created 
an informal hearing process for nursing facilities to challenge the im-
position of this intermediate sanction. 164 In creating this new hearing 
process, Congress clearly stated that the process would not preclude 
nursing homes from seeking judicial review for factual disputes con-
cerning noncompliance. 165 
HHS promulgated specific regulations governing the imposition 
of the new sanction and a new corresponding hearing process in 
1985.166 The regulations granted nursing homes a hearing167 in front of 
a hearing officer168 before the imposition of this intermediate 
sanction. 169 This hearing· allowed a nursing home the opportunity to 
present evidence in person or in writing that proved it was in 
substantial compliance. 170 HHS would then issue a written ruling to 
the facility. 171 Even though HHS granted nursing homes these hearing 
rights to appeal the intermediate sanction, it specifically limited the 
hearing to "something less than a full evidentiary hearing." 172 In the 
preamble of the proposed rule, HHS stated, "[W]e believe that since 
the imposition of a denial of payments as compared with terminations 
is a lesser and temporary sanction, a hearing less than a full 
evidentiary hearing would satisfy all due process requirements." 173 
Therefore, according to HHS, the hearing nursing homes received for 
the imposition of this intermediate sanction would only be an 
"informal" one. 174 Nursing homes were only granted a full evidentiary 
163 H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 57. Congress recognized that states already had 
a full array of sanctions for Medicaid and said that this rule would not pre-empt these 
sanctions. 
164 H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 56. 
165 H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 57. 
166 The final rule was codified at 42 C.F.R. § 442.118 (1986). The delay be-
tween the passage of the OBRA of 1980 and the promulgation of regulations was due 
to the change in administration and its focus on privatizing nursing home regulation. 
IOM REPORT, supra note 10, at 247. 
167 50 Fed. Reg. at 7193 (Feb. 21, 1985). In the legislative history, Congress 
made a point to note that it was not altering access or the process of the full eviden-
tiary hearing for termination. H.R. REP. No. 96-1479, at 141 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5903, 5932. 
168 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7193; 51 Fed. Reg. 24484 (Jul. 3, 1986). 
169 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487. 
170 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194; 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487. 
171 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. 
172 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. 
173 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. 
174 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. See also 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487. HHS failed to pro-
vide a definition of a full evidentiary hearing versus an informal hearing in the Fed-
eral Register, so the definition for the AP A controls. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 
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hearing when HHS threatened termination from the Medicare 
Program. 175 This dichotomy between a formal and informal hearing 
continued until 1987 when Congress passed the Nursing Home 
Reform Act of 1984 (NHRA) eliminating this difference. 176 
The NHRA, which changed the entire survey and certification 
process, was the culmination of a report issued by the IOM177 and 
numerous hearings held by Congress. 178 The NHRA179 included seven 
specific sections regulating the care of Medicare- and Medicaid-
certified nursing homes, including a revision of the survey and certifi-
cation process and the enforcement process. 180 The survey and certifi-
cation section created a system by which nursing homes would be 
inspected annually and the enforcement section directed HHS to im-
2005). According to the AP A, a formal hearing is defined as, "every case of adjudica-
tion required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity of an agency 
hearing ... "5 U.S.C.A. § 554. 
175 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. Congress purposely did not alter nursing homes 
access to a full evidentiary hearing to challenge termination from Medicare. H.R. 
REP. No. 96-1479, at 141 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5903, 
5932. 
176 Nursing Home Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-160 
(1987). 
177 To compile a study of quality of care in nursing homes, the IOM formed 
the Committee on Nursing Home Regulation, a committee consisting of twenty mem-
bers with knowledge and experience in the regulation of nursing homes. 10M 
REPORT, supra note I 0, at v-vi. Data for the Report was collected from sundry places. 
Public hearings were held in five different cities; reports from I 978 HHS hearings 
and congressional hearings on nursing home quality were reviewed; surveys were 
mailed to every state licensure and certification director; and case studies were con-
ducted in six states. Id at vi-vii. The Committee compiled its research and published 
its recommendations in March of I 986 to change the regulation of nursing homes to 
ensure that residents were provided quality care.Id at I. 
178 In 1982, President Reagan tried to deregulate the nursing home industry by 
reducing the inspection requirements of facilities with good compliance records and 
replacing government certification with accreditation by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations, the same body that accredits hospitals.Jd. 
at 248-49. Members of Congress and the public viewed these changes as a means to 
reduce federal oversight of the nursing home industry.Jd. at 248. Congress imposed a 
moratorium on the proposed changes and ordered the IOM to study the quality of care 
provided in nursing homes and publish a report. On March 25, 1986, Dr. Katz, the 
Chair of the Committee on Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report, 
presented the 10M Report at a hearing held by the House of Representative's Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce. Jd at 2. The IOM Report recommended forty-eight 
changes, including changes in the survey and certification of nursing homes and the 
hearing process granted nursing homes out of compliance with the Medicare regula-
tions.Jd at 25. 
179 Nursing Home Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-160 
(1987). 
180 H.R. REP. No. I00-39l(D, at 453-79 (1st Sess. 1987). 
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pose remedies such as denial of payment for new admissions, civil 
money penalties, and temporary management. 181 The enforcement 
section also required HHS and the states to impose harsher remedies 
for repeated noncompliance. 182 It took eight years for HHS to promul-
gate final rules implementing the NHRA. 183 
In the NHRA, Congress changed the severity of the sanctions as 
well as the structure of the hearing process. 184 Congress added several 
more sanctions, now entitled "remedies," to the Medicare Program. 185 
Congress mandated that HHS take into account repeat deficiencies 
when imposing these remedies and made it harder for a facility that 
had been terminated from the Medicare program to reenter the pro-
gram. 186 Additionally, Congress. combined the formal hearing for ter-
mination and the informal hearing for other sanctions into a single 
hearing process. 187 This process was implemented in 1995, when HHS 
promulgated the hearing process regulations. The relevant regulations 
are 42 C.P.R. §§ 498.60, 188 498.62, 189 and 498.66. 190 Under these new 
regulations nursing homes are granted the right to present evidence in 
front of an ALJ, 191 unlike the original informal hearing process where 
181 H.R. REP. No. 100-391(0, at 465-77. 
182 H.R. REP. No. 100-391(1), at 474. 
183 See 59 Fed. Reg. 56116 (Nov. 10, 1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 50441 (Sept. 29, 
1995). There have been no drastic changes in the regulations governing the hearing 
process since these amendments. 
184 These changes were based on the recommendations made in the IOM 
Report. See 133 CONG. REc. S5714-02 (1987); 133 CONG. REc. E2598-01 (1987). 
According to the IOM Report, more nursing homes would comply if the sanction was 
imposed prior to a hearing. IOM REPORT, supra note 10, at 159. Moreover, to prevent 
frivolous appeals, the IOM Committee suggested that facilities not be given a stay 
from termination during the appeals process and that deficiency findings be solely 
based on the events that occurred during the survey and not the condition of the facil-
ity at the time of the hearing. !d. 
185 H.R. REP. No. 100-391(II), at 941-43 (2d Sess. 1987). 
186 101 Stat. at 1330-160. These sections were based on the recommendations 
made in the IOM Report. IOM REPORT, supra note 10, at 155-156. 
187 H.R. REP. No. l00-391(II), at 941-43; Medicare Program; Appeals Proce-
dures for Determinations the Affect Participation in Medicare, 52 Fed. Reg. 22444, 
22447-22448 (June 12, 1987). 
188 This regulation defines the conduct of nursing home hearings, which is left 
to the discretion of the ALJ within certain limits. 42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2005). One 
particular limit is how witnesses are treated. See 42 C.F.R. § 498.62. 
189 This regulation states that, "[t]he representative of each party is permitted 
to examine his or her own witnesses subject to interrogation by the representative of 
the other party." 42 C.F.R. § 498.62. 
190 This rule governs a nursing home's right to waive its right to appear and 
present evidence at an in-person hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 498.66. 
191 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.45, 498.60. 
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nursing homes would present evidence to a hearing officer. 192 The 
new regulations also gave nursing homes the right to examine their 
own witnesses at the hearing193 and bring any participant to the hear-
ing not limited to their representatives and technical advisors. 194 
The current hearing system is a drastic change from the hearings 
that took place before the passage of the NHRA, which only allowed 
informal hearings for the imposition of remedies other than terrnina-
tion.195 The evolution from an informal hearing process to a formal 
hearing process to challenge noncompliance findings reflects Con-
gressional intent to provide nursing homes with procedural due proc-
ess by providing a full evidentiary hearing. As of the date of this arti-
cle, these regulations still govern the survey and certification process. 
Nevertheless, HHS has limited a nursing home's right to a hearing. 
HHS only allows nursing homes to challenge noncompliance findings 
when a remedy is imposed, 196 even though the findings remain on 
HHS's website and are used for the imposition of future remedies, 
namely the loss of Medicare payments.197 Nonetheless, as discussed in 
Part III of this article, HHS has instituted practices that limit the re-
viewability of claims in both the administrative agency process and in 
the federal courts. 198 As a result of these practices, nursing homes 
have been denied any meaningful review when they are deprived of 
property, which is a violation of the Constitution, the APA, and the 
Medicare Act and regulations. 
Hence, nursing homes filed a suit in federal court to challenge the 
lack of procedural due process protections afforded ther;n in Medicare 
compliance hearings. 199 However, these claims were never fully re-
viewed by the Supreme Court. Instead, the Court dismissed the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the Medicare Act's 
limitation of federal-question jurisdiction.200 As a result of the dis-
missal of this case, nursing homes still have no right to a hearing 
192 51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24491 (Jul. 3, 1986). 
193 42 C.F.R. § 498.62. 
194 42 C.F.R. § 498.60. 
195 50 Fed. Reg. 7194 (Feb. 21, 1985). 
196 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.406, 498.3(b)(13). 
197 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.330(e)(3), 498.3(b)(13). 
198 See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Dallas Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Health & Human Servs. Comrn'n, 921 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Int'l Long 
Term Care, Inc. v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1996); Mich. Ass'n of Homes & 
Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1997). 
199 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council), 529 U.S. I 
(2000). The nursing homes challenged several issues including the right to procedural 
due process. I d. at 7. 
zoo Jd. at 6. 
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when deprived of property and are barred from bringing a constitu-
tional claim in federal court to challenge this practice. 
ill. NO FEDERAL REVIEW: THE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION BAR 
The failure of HHS to recognize that the NHRA, as codified in the 
Medicare regulations, grants nursing homes the right to a full eviden-
tiary hearing for any findings of noncompliance was the basis of Ill. 
Counci/.201 The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council)/02 
on behalf of its members, sued HHS Secretary Donna Shalala for the 
violation of their constitutional right to due process.203 The case ulti-
mately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but the constitutional claims 
were never decided because of the Medicare Act's subject matter ju-
risdiction bar to federal review.204 The Medicare Act requires nursing 
homes to first present any case to HHS and receive a final ruling from 
HHS before submitting a claim in federal court?05 
Although there is an exception that allows federal review of a case 
if there is no meaningful agency review, the Court did not apply this 
exception in Ill. Council. 206 According to the Court, the exception 
only applied when an entire industry was denied meaningful review, 
not when only individual nursing homes were harmed.207 Contrary to 
the Court's opinion, the entire nursing home industry has been hurt by 
HHS's continued practices of denying hearing rights to challenge 
noncompliance findings. 208 Because of a quirk in the nursing home 
201 Id 
202 The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, incorporated under the laws of 
Illinois, is an association of approximately two hundred nursing homes doing business 
in Illinois. See Ill. Council for Long Term Care, Inc. v. Shalala, No. 96 C 2953, 1997 
WL 158347, at *I (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
203 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 6. 
2o4 Id 
205 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g)-(h) (West 2005). 
206 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986). 
207 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 22-23. 
208 The ALJs summarily dismiss nursing home appeals in Medicare noncom-
pliance cases when HHS has not imposed a remedy. See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB 
No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1997) (final determination); Jacinto City 
Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage 
Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); 
Lutheran Home- Caledonia, DAB No. CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
2000) (initial determination); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakeland Lodge Nursing 
Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care 
Ctr., DAB No. CR!029 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brigh-
ton, DAB No. CR1104 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Manorcare Health 
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hearing process that prevents nursing homes from having a hearing to 
challenge noncompliance findings when no remedy is imposed, nurs-
ing homes never obtain a final ruling. Without a final ruling, the fed-
eral courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. Thus, nursing homes 
are left with no meaningful review of noncompliance findings posted 
on the Internet, used for the imposition of future remedies, and used as 
the basis ofMedicare fraud and abuse claims. 
A. The Social Security Act's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Bar 
Under sections 405(g) and 405(h) of the Medicare Act, federal 
courts are barred from reviewing any Social Security action under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331209 and 1346210 before HHS has issued a final ruling. 
Specifically, section 405(g) of the Medicare Act states: 
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner 
of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective ofthe amount in controversy, may obtain a 
review of such decision by a civil action .... Such action shall 
be brought in the district court of the United States .... 211 
This section limits federal review to final decisions issued by the Sec-
retary. This review is further limited by section 405(h), which says: 
No fmdings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social 
Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or gov-
ernmental agency except as herein provided. No action 
against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under 
Servs. Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004). For Initial 
Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu of in-person testimony, 
see DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name con-
cealed) (on file with author). 
209 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U .S.C.A. § 
1331 (West 2005). 
210 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, of [a]ny civil action against the United States 
for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax ... [or] any other civil action or claim 
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or 
upon any express or implied contract with the United States .... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 
(West 2005). 
211 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
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section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim aris-
ing under this subchapter. 212 
Section 405(h) prohibits federal review of claims based on federal 
question jurisdiction unless the statute authorizes agency review and 
the Secretary issues a fmal decision. Together, sections 405(g) and (h) 
prevent individuals from submitting claims in federal court, because 
without federal question jurisdiction the court has no jurisdiction over 
the case, and thus does not have the power to hear the subject, or is-
sues, which arise in the case. This bar to federal review before a fmal 
decision from the Secretary was incorporated into the Medicare Act 
by 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(h)(l)(A).213 
Although Congress enacted these limitations in 1935/14 the 
Supreme Court did not use sections 405 (g) and (h) to bar claims until 
1975 in Weinberger v. Salfi.215 The Court did not provide any 
explanation for the use of sections 405 (g) and (h) in this case, while 
for forty years these sections had not been mentioned in any Social 
Security claims in federal court.216 Although Congress drafted these 
sections, the Supreme Court's inconsistent decisions concerning the 
effect of this section is what has caused harm. The Supreme Court 
decided four main cases regarding sections 405(g) and (h), but in each 
case the Court has issued different rulings allowing some claims to be 
barred from any meaningful review,217 while allowing federal review 
of claims never presented to HHS.218 The Court's contradictory 
opinions lead nursing homes to submit a claim in federal court 
without presenting the matter to HHS and resulted in a ruling that has 
ultimately left nursing homes with no meaningful review. 
1. The Supreme Court's Discovery of the Social Security Bar to 
Federal Review 
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Salfi, establishing a broad 
rule barring federal court review of all claims arising under the Social 
Security Act regardless of whether they involved constitutional or 
212 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(h) (West 2005). 
213 Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(h)(l)(A), nursing homes are granted a right 
to a hearing. These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S. C. §§ 405(g)-(h). 
(1935). 
214 See generally Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 
215 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
216 See id 
217 Heclderv. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984). 
218 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). 
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statutory challenges.219 In Salfi, a class action suit was brought in fed-
eral district court challenging HHS 's denial of Social Security benefits 
because of the duration of relationship requirement. 220 According to 
the duration requirement, the surviving spouse must have been mar-
ried to the deceased worker for at least nine months before the death 
of the worker to receive Social Security benefits.221 The class repre-
sented both members that had been denied and those that had not yet 
submitted claims for benefits.222 The class asserted that the duration 
requirement was tmconstitutional based on the Equal Protection 
Clause and requested the immediate payment of benefits.223 Even 
though neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction and the resolution 
of the jurisdiction issue did not resolve the entire case, the Supreme 
Court ruled that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
members of the class that had not presented their case to HHS ?24 Ac-
cording to the Court, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) barred federal review of 
claims arising under the Social Security Act until two steps had been 
completed: the case had first been presented to the agency and the 
Secretary had issued a fmal ruling.225 
The complainants argued that the section was merely an exhaus-
tion requirement. 226 Courts usually require exhaustion "as a matter of 
preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the 
agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportu-
nity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the 
benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which 
IS adequate for judicial review."227 The complainants argued that 
219 Salfi, 422 U.S. at 770. 
220 Id at 754. 
221 Pub. L. No. 90-248 §§ 156(a)-(b), 81 Stat. 866 (1967) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5) & (e)(2) (2000)). 
222 Salfi, 422 U.S. at 755. 
223 Id The United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
ruled for the class and granted declaratory'and injunctive relief Id 
224 Id at 752. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice 
Marshall, made a point to note the fact that the jurisdictional issue was not raised by 
either party, was only discussed in passing in the oral arguments, and did not resolve 
the entire case. Id at 785-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court should not 
have discussed the jurisdiction issue. Id at 788. 
225 Jd at 756 (majority opinion). 
226 Id at 755. Furthermore, the dissent contended that the channeling provi-
sion of 42 U.S. C. § 405(h) was merely an exhaustion requirement for questions of 
fact and statutory interpretation. Id at 789 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To support this 
contention, Justice Brennan cited to the legislative history when the amendment was 
passed and the Social Security Board's discussion of the statute immediately after its 
passage. Id at 790-792. 
227 Jd at 765 (majority opinion). The two relevant exceptions to the exhaus-
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completing the agency process was futile because the issue of consti-
tutionality is outside the scope of the Secretary's authority.228 The 
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was not a mere exhaus-
tion requirement, but that the federal review bar prohibited all federal 
review save for those actions mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).229 
The Court announced that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was not limited to 
mere decisions of fact or law, but also applied to any action seeking to 
recover under the Social Security Act, including constitutional ques-
tions.230 Therefore, according to the Court, even constitutional claims 
must first be brought to the agency so that the Secretary may deter-
mine if the claims can be resolved under the Social Security Act.231 
Because the members of the class were seeking payment of Social 
Security benefits, their claims arose under the Act and were not re-
viewable until the claims were first presented to HHS and the Secre-
tary issued a final ruling.232 Nevertheless, the members of the class 
that had presented their case to HHS were not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 
405(h) so the Court went on to address the substantive issue of the 
complaint.233 The Court extended the bar to federal review of Social 
Security claims to Medicare claims in Heckler v. Ringer.234 
I~ Ringer, 235 four Medicare recipients brought an action in federal 
court based on federal question jurisdiction challenging the disallow-
ance of benefits to cover a surgical procedure to relieve respiratory 
distress.236 Medicare patients seeking reimbursement for the proce-
dure were awarded money to cover their surgery costs until 1980, 
when HHS issued a formal administrative ruling prohibiting reim-
bursement for the surgery. 237 Three of the four claimants had already 
tion requirement in this case are futility of review and irreparable harm. Abbott Labs. 
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 
99 (1977); McKart v. U.S., 395 United States 185, 197-201 (1969). 
228 Salfi, 422 U.S. at 757. 
229 Id at 762. 
230 Id · 
23t Id 
232 Id. at 763. The dissent also asserted that the case did not arise under the 
Social Security Act. Instead, the claim arose under the Equal Protection Clause, a 
constitutional matter. Id at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
233 Id at 760. 
234 Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984). 
235 Id 
236 Id at 605. Their claims were dismissed by the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rein-
stated by the United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
237 Medicare Program, Exclusion From Medicare Coverage of Bilateral Ca-
rotid Body Resection to Relieve Pulmonary Distress, 45 Fed. Reg. 71426-71427 (Oct. 
28, 1980). Because of the lack of acceptance by the medical community over the 
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had the surgery before 1980 and were seeking reimbursement, while 
Ringer, the fourth claimant, could not afford the surgery and was 
seeking money to tmdergo surgery.238 Each claimant was at a different 
stage in the appeal process, but none of the claimants had received a 
fmal ruling from the Secretary.239 The Supreme Court dismissed three 
of the cases because the claimant had surgery before the Secretary 
issued the administrative ruling and was not barred from reimburse-
ment by the ruling.240 
The only remaining claimant, Ringer, had requested payment 
from HHS, but the Secretary was unwilling to issue a ruling in his 
case until he underwent the surgery.241 Ringer had not undergone the 
surgery because he was indigent and was seeking a judgment to obtain 
the money necessary for the surgery.242 In response to Ringer's case, 
the Court ruled that section 405(h) applied to his claim because al-
though he maintained that the administrative ruling was unconstitu-
tional, he was still seeking reimbursement of the award of benefits 
under the Medicare Act. 243 Thus, his claims arose under the Medicare 
Act.244 According to the Court, regardless of whether his claim chal-
lenged the procedures of HHS or the substance of HHS 's actions, 
Ringer's claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which barred federal 
review on the claims until a final action from the Secretary.245 
The Court barred review even though there was an exception to 
the 405(h) bar that would have allowed Ringer's case to be reviewed 
in federal court.Z46 Specifically, the Secretary had drafted an exception 
to the subject matter jurisdiction requirement to allow cases to go to 
federal court after the reconsideration stage "when the only factor 
precluding an award of benefits is a statutory provision which the 
claimant challenges as unconstitutiona1."247 The Court ruled that the 
exception did not apply in this case because the constitutional claims 
effectiveness of the surgery, the Secretary issued an administrative instruction to all 
fiscal intermediaries and ALJs that no payment is to be made for Medicare claims for 
the surgical procedure to relive respiratory distress. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 607. 
238 Ringer, 466 U.S. at 609-10. 
239 Jd.at610. 
240 Id. at 613. 
241 Id. at 609-10. 
242 Id. at 610. 
243 Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(h)(1)(A), nursing homes are granted a right to 
a hearing. These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)-(h). 
244 Ringer, 466 U.S. at 614-15. 
245 Id. at 615. 
246 Id. at 627. 
247 Id. at 606 n.2. 
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were inextricably linked with Ringer's benefits claims.248 Further-
more, the Court ruled that the claimant seeking money to have the 
surgery still had an avenue of review even if there was a presumption 
against reimbursement. 249 Thus, Ringer's case was dismissed for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction?50 Effectively, this left Ringer with no 
avenue for review because he had no right to agency review until after 
he underwent the surgery, which he could not afford.251 Although the 
Court's decision in Ringer left him with no meaningful administrative 
or federal review, the Court did not allow this as an exception. The 
Court's decision was particularly disturbing because in Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians an exception to sections 
405(g) & (h) was allowed when physicians were left with no mean-
ingful administrative or federal review,252 a direct contradiction to the 
Ringer decision. 
In Bowen, the Court allowed Medicare providers to forgo pre-
sentment to HHS and a final decision because there was no right to 
agency review. 253 The Supreme Court also created an exception to the 
subject matter jurisdiction bar in Matthews v. Eldridge.254 In Eldridge, 
the Court. allowed a Social Security beneficiary to obtain federal re-
view without a final ruling because his Constitutional claim was col-
lateral to his claims arising under the Social Security Act. 255 The 
nursing home association in Ill. Council argued that their case met 
both of these exceptions; however, the Court classified the nursing 
homes' claims as similar to those filed in Salfi and Ringer and dis-
missed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 256 
248 !d. at 614. 
249 !d. 
250 !d. at 626-27. 
251 The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, agreed with the Court's decision concerning the three claimants that 
had the surgery before 1980. !d. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the dissent 
reiterated their argument from Salfi that Ringer was not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
because his claim arose under the Constitution, not the Medicare Act. !d. at 631. 
Moreover, the dissent asserted that Ringer had no other avenue for review because the 
Secretary refused to issue a ruling on his case until he actually had the surgery, which 
he was unable to afford. !d. at 630. Thus, until he raised the money to have the sur-
gery, he was prohibited from bringing any agency action or federal claim to challenge 
the denial of payment. !d. at 629. 
252 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). 
253 !d. at 678. 
254 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
255 !d. at 330. 
256 See infra Part IV.B. 
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2. Exceptions to Social Security Act Bar to Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction 
757 
The Supreme Court decided in 1975 to impose the subject matter 
jurisdiction requirement for all cases arising under the Social Security 
Act regardless of the content of the claim and seemingly cut off Social 
Security claimants' access to the federal courts.257 In 1976, the Court 
created the first exception to this requirement for constitutional claims 
collateral to claims arising under the Social Security Act.258 
The Supreme Court allowed the Social Security recipient in 
Eldridge to bring a claim in federal court challenging the 
constitutionality of the procedures afforded in a Social Security 
hearing even though he had not fulfilled the subject matter jurisdiction 
requirements announced in Salfi.259 In Eldridge, Mr. Eldridge 
challenged the Secretary's decision to revoke his Social Security 
disability benefits prior to providing an evidentiary hearing.260 
Eldridge received a letter from the state agency administering Social 
Security benefits stating that his disability had ceased and thus his 
payments would be terminated.261 Eldridge responded to the agency in 
writing disputing the characterization of his medical condition.262 The 
state agency reviewed his response, but issued a fmal determination 
that Eldridge's disability had ceased.263 HHS accepted the state's 
determination and sent a letter to Eldridge stating that his benefits 
would be cancelled in July and granted him appeal rights.264 Instead of 
appealing the determination, Eldridge filed suit . in federal court 
challenging the constitutionality of HHS 's practice of granting only a 
post-termination hearing to appeal the termination of disability 
benefits rather than a pre-termination hearing.265 He also requested 
immediate reinstatement of his benefits pending such a hearing.266 
The Secretary moved for dismissal based on the Supreme Court's 
257 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975). 
258 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332. 
259 !d. at 326. 
260 !d. at 324-25. 
261 !d. at 324. 
262 !d. at 324. 
263 !d. 
264 !d. 
265 !d. at 324-25. 
266 !d. at 324-325. The district court found that HHS's procedures violated 
Eldridge's due process rights because the hearing was a post-termination hearing 
rather than a pre-termination hearing that would ensure the uninterrupted payment of 
benefits to Eldridge. !d. at 326. 
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decision in Salji that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) required Eldridge to present 
the case to HHS and receive a fmal ruling before federal review.267 
The Supreme Court ruled that Eldridge's letter to the state disput-
ing the characterization of his medical condition fulfilled the "pre-
sentment requirement" of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), even though Eldridge 
did not raise any constitutional question in his letter and never submit-
ted the case to HHS.268 This was not fatal to his claim because 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) only required a presentment of the issues relating to 
the Social Security Act, not that all issues be presented to HHS.Z69 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Eldridge's constitutional claims 
were collateral to his claim for future Social Security benefits.270 The 
Court reasoned that Eldridge's claim regarding the timing of the bene-
fits hearing under the Social Security Act did not arise under the So-
cial Security Act b~cause without this review Eldridge's constitutional 
claim would never be addressed.271 Finally, the Court found that the 
finality requirement was waivable and waived the requirement be-
cause Eldridge's case was so significant "that deference to the 
agency's judgment is inappropriate."272 
Hence, the Court seemingly created an exception for Eldridge 
where if 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) would serve to bar federal review, then 
the case could be filed in federal court after presentment to the 
agency. The Court's decision in Eldridge was a major shift from its 
decision in Salji barring federal review until both steps were fulfilled. 
Amazingly, the Court ignored this decision when sections 405(g) and 
(h) were used to bar Ringer's constitutional claims from any re-
view.273 In fact, the exception applied in Eldridge was never used 
again and never overruled, making it a mere aberration. However ten 
years later, the Court allowed Medicare physicians in Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians to skip the entire agency 
process in spite of the subject matter jurisdiction bar when there was 
no meaningful agency review.274 
In Bowen, an association of family physicians filed a lawsuit chal-
lenging the validity of a HHS regulation permitting lower payments 
for similar services based on the type of physician providing the 
267 Id. at 325. 
268 Id. at 329. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 330-31. 
271 Id. at 331. 
272 Id. at 330. 
273 Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984). 
274 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. ofFami1y Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986). 
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care.275 The Secretary argued that Congress had prohibited any federal 
review of amount determinations under Medicare Part B. 276 According 
to the Secretary, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only granted hearing rights to 
those under Medicare Part A and 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded all 
administrative and judicial review of claims not noted in 42 U.S.C. § 
405(g).277 The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative history of the 
AP A proved otherwise.278 Specifically, the Senate and House Judici-
ary Committee Report stated that there is a presumption of review 
unless explicitly stated otherwise.279 Moreover, the legislative history 
from 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h) confmed all amount determinations 
solely to the agency "to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor 
matters[,]" but did not discuss any other claims?80 Therefore, the 
Court ruled that because Congress neither granted HHS the authority 
to review all other claims nor clearly prohibited federal review of 
these issues, the physicians' claims regarding the constitutionality of 
the regulations was reviewable. 281 Hence, the Court ruled that the 
physicians did not have to present the claim to HHS or wait until the 
Secretary issued a final ruling as required by Salfi and Ringer.282 
The Court's decision in Bowen that Congress did not intend to 
prevent federal review harkens back to the principles of fairness es-
poused by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary when discussing the 
AP A. 283 In enacting the AP A, Congress specifically noted that the 
withholding of judicial review was rare and limited to when the intent 
was clear.284 In 1997, an association of nursing homes, the Council, 
filed a case in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 
Medicare regulations and the survey and certification procedures. 285 
The Council filed their claims in federal court because HHS could not 
meaningfully resolve constitutional claims, which is within the sole 
jurisdiction ofthe federal courts.286 The Supreme Court dismissed the 
275 Jd. 
276 Jd. at 669. 
277 Id at 673. 
278 Jd at 678. 
279 H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 41 (1946); S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945). 
280 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 677 (citing 118 CoNG. REc. 33992 (1972)). 
281 Jd at 681. 
282 Jd. at 680. 
283 S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26. 
284 S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26; H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 41. 
285 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (fl/. Council), 529 U.S. I 
(2000). 
286 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); United States v. Nourse, 34 
u.s. 8, 28-29 (1835). 
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case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, precluding nursing homes 
from any meaningful review. 
B. Ill. Council: The Death Knell for Nursing Home's Access to 
Federal Review 
In 1998, the Council filed a complaint seeking injunctive and de-
claratory relief from the Secretary's and the Illinois Department of 
Public Health's use of the Medicare regulations, claiming that the 
drastic· change in noncompliance rates was due to unconstitutionally 
vague standards. 287 Moreover, the Council submitted that the appeals 
process to challenge noncompliance fmdings was meaningless and 
thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.288 The Council argued that (1) certain terms in the 
Medicare regulations such as "substantial compliance" were unconsti-
tutionally vague; (2) the regulations and the State Operations Manual 
would allow inconsistent survey results in violation of the Medicare 
Act and exceeded the mandate of the Medicare Act; (3) the regula-
tions created administrative procedures inconsistent with the Due 
Process Clause; and (4) the State Operations Manual and other publi-
. cations used by surveyors in citing nursing homes for deficiencies was 
not promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking requirements 
mandated by the AP A. 289 
Instead of addressing these issues, HHS collaterally attacked the 
Council's claims by arguing that the federal court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, under 28 u.s.c. §§ 133 e90 and 1346,291 to hear the 
287 Several other cases challenged the constitutionality of the Medicare regu-
lations, but many have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Mich. Ass'n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 
1997); Am. Acad. of Dermatology v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 118 F.3d 
1495, 1499-1501 (lith Cir. 1997); St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 805, 812-
14 (3rd Cir. 1994); Farkas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield ofMich., 24 F.3d 853, 855-60 
(6th Cir. 1994); Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37,41-44 (2nd Cir. 1992); Nat' I Kidney 
Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1130-1134 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the circuits regarding the Bowen 
case and whether it created an exception to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-(h). Therefore, the 
Court did not discuss the Council's Medicaid claims. 
288 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 7. 
289 !d. 
290 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1331 (West 2005). 
291 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, of ... any other civil action or claim against 
the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Consti-
tution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon 
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case because the case arose under the Medicare Act.292 Under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h), federal courts are barred from reviewing 
any Medicare action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 before the 
issue is presented to HHS and HHS has issued a final ruling.293 The 
requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and (h) allowed the Secretary to 
channel all nursing home claims through the agency in a special re-
view process. 294 Based on this bar, HHS requested that the Supreme 
Court dismiss the case because the Council never presented the case 
to HHS and failed to receive a fmal agency ruling before filing the 
claim in federal court. 295 Before resolving the Council's substantive 
claims, the Court first had to determine whether it had subject matter 
jUrisdiction by discussing its precedent. 
The Court held that in Salfi it had ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
created a nonwaivable and nonexcusable requirement that an 
individual present a claim to the Secretary before seeking federal 
review when the claim arose under the Social Security Act. 296 A claim 
arose under the Social Security Act when the Act provided "both the 
standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of th[ e] 
constitutional contentions."297 Because the class members included 
requests for the payment of Social Security benefits, making it clear 
that the claims arose under the Social Security Act, the Court 
dismissed the claims of all the members.298 The Court in Ill. Council 
noted that the Council's arguments did not contain any claim for 
benefits like the parties in Salfi but was still barred by the channeling 
provision by the Court's decision in Ringer. The Court in Ringer ruled 
that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) prevented federal review of a chalienge to the 
Secretary's issuance of an administrative ruling denying 
reimbursement for a particular medical procedure where "both the 
standing and the substantive basis for the presentation" of a claim is 
the Medicare Act.299 
any express or implied contract with the United States .... " 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (West 
2005). 
292 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 8-9. 
293 Id at 7-10. 
294 Id at 11-12. 
295 I d. at 8-9. 
296 Id at 15. 
297 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761 (1975). 
298 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at II, 15. The Court in Ill. Council incorrectly states 
that the claims of all the class members in Salfi were dismissed. See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 
752. 
299 Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 615 (1984) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975)). This rule applies to both present and future claims for 
benefits. Id at 622. 
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Based on these cases, the Court in Ill. Council reasoned that 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) was a channeling provision that required all cases to 
be presented to the agency.30° Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 
requirement was more than an exhaustion requirement, which pro-
vides for exceptions to presentment, but also an absolute require-
ment.301 Even though the Court noted that this ruling might cause 
some hardship, the complexities of Medicare and the need for the Sec-
retary to have an opportunity to "apply, interpret, or revise policies, 
regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by 
different individual courts applying 'ripeness' and 'exhaustion' excep-
tions [on a] case by case [basis]" justified this channeling proce-
dure. 302 Additionally, the Court found no reason to distinguish be-
tween how 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was applied to amount determinations 
versus constitutional challenges. 303 The Council submitted that the 
Court's decisions in McNmy v. Haitian Refitgee Center, Inc., 304 El-
dridge,305 and Bowen306 provided exceptions to this absolute channel-
ing rule. 307 
In response to the Council's arguments, the Court ruled that in El-
dridge the claimant seeking Social Security disability benefits had 
presented the case first to the agency as required by 42 U.S.C. § 
405(h), unlike the Council.308 The Court in Ill. Council ruled that even 
though Eldridge had not completed the process and received a fmal 
ruling, presentment of his claim to the state agency was enough be-
cause his constitutional claims were collateral to his claims for bene-
fits. 309 Hence, the decision in Eldridge did not assist the Council be-
cause they failed to present their case to HHS.310 
Additionally, the Court in Ill. Council also ruled that the excep-
tion to 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) announced in Bowen only applied in in-
300 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 12. 
301 !d. at 13. 
302 !d. 
303 !d. at 14. 
304 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding that 
individuals challenging the Immigration and Naturalization Services administration of 
the Special Agricultural Workers provisions of the Immigration Reform Control Act 
to determine the adjustment status of immigrants could be reviewed in federal court 
based on federal question jurisdiction to evaluate issues concerning the Due Process 
Clause, even though the statute barred federal question jurisdiction) 
305 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (creating an exception to the 
subject matter jurisdiction bar). 
306 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). 
307 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 13-14. 
308 !d. at 15. 
309 !d. 
310 !d. 
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stances when the provision would foreclose any review because a 
serious constitutional issue would be raised if 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was 
constructed to deny, rather than delay, judicial review of constitu-
tional claims.311 Moreover, the Court rejected the proposition that 
Bowen created a new rule that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) only applied to 
amount determinations because it would overrule Salfi and Ringer.312 
The Court opined that if it had planned to overrule these cases in Bo-
wen, then it would have said so in its opinion.313 The difference be-
tween Salji, Ringer, and Bowen is the difference between postpone-
ment of review (Salfi and Ringer) and total preclusion (Bowen).314 
Consequently, the Court reviewed the Council's claims to ascertain 
whether the regulations would prevent any judicial review, and thus 
whether the Bowen exception applied. 
The Council argued that HHS's application of its channeling 
provision to the portion of the Medicare statute and regulations 
governing nursing home hearings amounted to the · "practical 
equivalent of a total denial of judicial review."315 According to the 
Council, nursing homes were granted access to the special review 
process only when termination was imposed, not when the Secretary 
imposed any other remedy.316 The Secretary asserted that any 
"dissatisfied" nursing home was entitled to have reviewed any 
determination that it failed to comply substantially with the statute, 
agreements, or regulations, regardless of the remedy imposed during 
the normal hearing process.317 The Court deferred to the Secretary's 
interpretation because it was reasonable.318 
The Council also argued that under 42 C.P.R. § 498.3(b)(l2), 
unless a remedy was imposed, no hearing was granted.319 If no rem-
edy was imposed, then a nursing home could fail to complete a plan of 
correction; however, the Secretary could then terminate the facility 
from Medicare participation.320 No facility would risk termination to 
bring a constitutional challenge, so these regulations precluded federal 
review. The Council contended that this was unconstitutional because 
311 Jd. at 18-19. 
312 ld. at 17-18. 
313 ld. 
314 Jd. at 19. 
315 Jd. at 22 (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 497 
(1991)). 
316 I d. at 21. 
317 ld. 
318 /d. at 21 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 u.s. 837, 843 (1984)). 
319 I d. at 21. 
320 Jd. at21. 
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the findings are used in later surveys as a means for harsh remedies 
and are posted on the Internet. 321 The Secretary summarily denied 
these practices and asserted that only minor penalties would be im-
posed for failing to submit a plan of correction.322 The Secretary also 
stated that HHS does not "cause providers to suffer more severe pen-
alties in later enforcement actions based on findings that are unre-
viewable," but conceded that the findings of noncompliance remain 
on the Internet with a place for the nursing home to post a reply.323 
Based on the Secretary's representations of the HHS hearing 
process for nursing homes, the Court reasoned that the HHS hearing 
process would not absolutely bar nursing homes from obtaining judi-
cial review.324 Although the Court found that the language of the stat-
ute and 42 C.P.R. § 498.3 was not free from ambiguity,325 the Secre-
tary's interpretation that nursing homes were permitted to a hearing 
for findings of noncompliance regardless of the imposition of a rem-
edy was reasonable and legally permissible. 326 The Council also chal-
lenged the regulatory procedures that prevented challenges to the level 
of nursing noncompliance or imposition of penalty.327 Because the 
·Council brought this suit as a preemptory challenge to the regulations 
it was unable to provide specific facts to rebut the Secretary's 
claims.328 The Court noted, however, that even if in individual cases 
the process resulted in a denial of judicial review, the Bowen excep-
tion was based on preclusion of review for an entire industry rather 
than the hardship of just one individual.329 In cases in which the hard-
ship was not industry wide, the Court deferred to the agency process 
because it provides the agency opportunity to "apply, interpret, or 
revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly premature 
interference by different individual courts applying 'ripeness' and 
'exhaustion' exceptions [on a] case by case [basis,]" but the agency 
can waive steps in the process to reach federal court or the court can 
"deem them waived in certain circumstances . . . even though the 
agency technically holds no 'hearing' on the claim."330 
321 Id. at 21-22. See also 42 C.P.R. § 498.3(b)(12) (2005). 
322 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 22. 
323 !d. (citation omitted). 
324 Id. at 23-24. 
325 See 42 C.P.R.§§ 498.3(b)(12), 498.1(a)-(b). 
326 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 21. 
327 Id. at 23-24. 
328 Id. at 51 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
329 Id. at 22. Individual hardship is addressed by excusing steps in the chan-
neling process once the individual has presented the case to the agency, which is 
nonwaivable and nonexcusable. Id. at 22-23. 
330 Id. at 13, 24 ("holding that Secretary's decision not to challenge the suffi-
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The Court's decision in Ill. Council limited the application of the 
Bowen exception to section 405(h) cases in which there was no 
agency hearing process. Thus, because Medicare regulations man-
dated a hearing process for a nursing home challenging deficiencies, 
the nursing home had to present its case to HHS and receive a fmal 
agency ruling before. submitting a case in federal court. Currently, 
HHS is not complying with the mandated hearing process of the 
Medicare regulations. Specifically, the Secretary's interpretation of 
the regulations that govern the nursing home hearing process, upon 
which the Court relied, was never adopted by the agency.331 Nursing 
homes do not have the right to appeal determinations of noncompli-
ance unless a certain remedy is imposed, although they are deprived 
of Medicare payments in later actions based of these fmdings.332 
Moreover, the Secretary does not grant nursing homes access to a full 
evidentiary hearing, thereby leaving nursing homes without the pro-
cedural due process rights that the Court relied upon in its ruling. 
These violations could be resolved if nursing homes could challenge 
the constitutionality of these practices. Only the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear these issues. However, nursing homes cannot 
bring these actions to federal court because of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Ill. Council. Nursing homes are barred by 42 U.S.C. §§ 
405(g) and (h) from seeking federal court review unless the nursing 
home presented that case to HHS and received a final ruling. HHS 
summarily dismisses these cases without issuing a fmal ruling. The 
finality requirement iswaivable ifthere would be no further meaning-
ful review,333 but HHS will not waive this requirement. Thus, the 
Court effectively barred nursing homes from any meaningful review. 
IV. THE REALITY OF NURSING HOME HEARINGS 
AFTER ILL. COUNCIL: A RIGHT TO NO MEANINGFUL 
REVIEW, THROUGH WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS 
In Ill. Council, the Secretary stated that any nursing home dissat-
isfied with noncompliance findings had a right to a hearing.334 The 
ciency of the appellees' exhaustion was in effect a determination that the agency had 
rendered a 'final decision' within the meaning of§ 405(g)" (citing Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-67 (1975))). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
330-32 (1976) (invoking practical conception of fmality to conclude that collateral 
nature of claim and potential irreparable injury from delayed review satisfy the "fmal 
decision" requirement of§ 405(g)). 
331 See fll. Council, 529 U.S. at 21. 
332 Id. 
333 See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763-67; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-32. 
334 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 20. 
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Secretary's interpretations of the regulations in Ill. Council, upon 
which the Court relied in making its decision to bar nursing homes 
from federal courts, 335 are contrary to the statements made by the Sec-
retl;!ry when the Medicare regulations were promulgated in 1994.336 
Moreover, it is not what actually happens within the nursing home 
hearing process.337 Nursing homes are prevented from receiving any 
evidentiary hearing unless HHS imposes appealable remedies or ter-
mination. Once a nursing home is granted a hearing, the hearing proc-
ess is so limited that there is no meaningful review of claims. The 
ALJs have begun to limit the hearing process to written direct testi-
mony and in-person cross-examination when there are no material 
facts in dispute. This is contrary to the Medicare Act and regulations, 
the Congressional intent of the Medicare Act and regulations, and the 
rules of section 554 of the AP A. Hence, as the Council argued in Ill. 
Council, the prohibition of federal review of constitutional challenges 
prior to presentment and final ruling by HHS amounts to the "practi-
cal equivalent of a total denial of judicial review"338 because federal 
courts never review these violations. 
A. The Right to No Meaningful Review 
When HHS finds a nursing home out of compliance with Medi-
care but does not impose a remedy, it does not provide a hearing to 
challenge the noncompliance findings. 339 According to HHS, these 
335 Id. at 21. 
336 See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 56158 (Nov. 10, 1994). 
337 ALJs summarily dismiss nursing home appeals in Medicare noncompli-
ance cases when HHS has not imposed a remedy. See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. 
1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1997) (final determination); Jacinto City 
Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage 
Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); 
Lutheran Home- Caledonia, DAB No. CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
2000) (initial determination); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. 2000); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CR1104 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2003); Manorcare Health Servs. Sandia, DAB No. 
CR1255 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004). 
338 I//. Council, 529 U.S. at 20 (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center Inc., 
498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991)). 
339 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.330(e)(3), 498.3(b)(13) (2005). Nursing homes have a 
right to challenge any fmdings of noncompliance at an informal dispute resolution 
(IDR) process. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331(2). This process is conducted by the state. The 
IDR process does not provide meaningful review because any decision made during 
.the process is merely a recommendation to CMS. It is within CMS's discretion 
whether or not to adopt IDR decisions. If CMS choose not to accept the findings of 
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unreviewable noncompliance fmdings do not deprive nursing homes 
of property or cause harm. 34° Contrary to HHS 's belief, this practice 
does deprive nursing homes of property, a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, and it causes nursing homes financial and reputation 
harm, a violation of the Medicare Act. Moreover, the fact that HHS 
denies nursing homes a right to a hearing directly contradicts the 
statements made by the Secretary in Ill. Council. 
1. Constitutional Violation 
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court ruled that the deprivation of 
property by an administrative agency required due process of law.341 
According to the Court, due process of law meant that individuals be 
granted a right to a hearing when deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected right, namely a right to property.342 Nursing homes found out of 
compliance with the Medicare Act and regulations not provided with a 
hearing are deprived of property even though no remedy is imposed. 
These disputed factual findings serve as the basis for the imposi-
tion of remedies for future incidents of noncompliance. 343 HHS regu-
larly uses these findings of noncompliance that are not adjudicated for 
future actions as mandated by the federal regulations.344 In fact, ac-
cording to 42 C.F.R. § 488.404, HHS is mandated to consider the 
nursing home's history of noncompliance in determining which reme-
dies to impose.345 Moreover, 42 C.F.R. § 488.438 requires HHS to 
consider a facility's history of noncompliance and any repeat defi-
ciencies when determining the amount of civil money penalty it will 
impose.346 HHS also uses the fmdings to determine Medicare fraud 
and abuse claims, which result in the loss of Medicare payments and 
substantial fines. 347 There is no opportunity to challenge the facts un-
derlying these unreviewable claims at a hearing?48 Therefore, HHS 's 
practices are depriving nursing homes of the property of Medicare 
the state there is still no appeal process. · 
340 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 22. 
341 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). 
342 Id. 
343 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f). 
344 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f). See also Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR887 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (remedies determination). 
345 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b)(2). 
346 42 C.F.R. § 488.438. 
347 Krause, supra note 16, at 55. See also Publication of the OIG Compliance 
Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14289, 14295 n.49 (Mar. 16, 
2000). 
348 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR887 (Dept' Health & Human Servs. 
2002) (remedies determination). 
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payments without any form of a hearing, violating the Fifth Amend-
ment. Not only does this violate the Due Process of Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, but it also contravenes the rights granted under the 
Medicare Act because it causes the nursing home injury. 
2. Violation of Medicare 
The Medicare Act grants hearing rights to nursing homes to the 
same extent as Social Security beneficiaries have when challenging 
denial of benefits.349 What this means is difficult to understand, but 
the meaning was made clear with the Secretary's interpretation in the 
Medicare regulations. Published in 1994, the fmal Medicare regula-
tions currently governing compliance for nursing homes addressed the 
issue of whether a nursing home has a right to a hearing when no rem-
edy is imposed. Specifically, the comments from the nursing home 
industry and response from the Secretary stated: 
Comment: Several commenters wanted a right to appeal all 
deficiencies, even if no remedy was imposed. 
Response: We are not accepting this suggestion because if no 
remedy is imposed, the provider has suffered no injwy calling 
for an appeal. We agree that deficiencies that constitute non-
compliance and that result in a remedy imposed are appeal-
able (except for minor remedies such as State monitoring).350 
Beginning in 1996, HHS attorneys filed Motions to Dismiss in Medi-
care compliance cases where the remedy imposed had been re-
scinded.351 From 1996 to 2004, six cases were dismissed by ALJs 
because a nursing home did not have a right to a hearing under the 
349 42 U.S.C.A § 405(g) (West 2005); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(h)(1)(A) (West 
2005). 
350 59 Fed. Reg. 56158 (Nov. 10, 1994) (emphasis added). 
351 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (fma1 determination); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage Manor of_Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); Lutheran Home - Caledonia, DAB No. 
CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakewood 
Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial 
determination); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CR1104 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); !Yianorcare Health Servs. Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 2004). 
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regulations if no remedy was imposed because there was no injury.352 
The first case decided by HHS on this issue was Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. 
HCFA. 353 
In Arcadia Acres, the nursing home challenged findings of non-
compliance based on surveys conducted on November 21, 1995 and 
January 18, 1996.354 HHS sent Arcadia Acres a letter on March 4, 
1996, imposing the remedy of denial of payments for new admissions, 
which HHS rescinded on April1, 1996.355 Arcadia Acres timely filed 
its hearing request, but the ALJ granted HHS's Motion to Dismiss.356 
HHS asserted that the 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(13)357 of the Medicare 
regulations only provided a nursing home a right to a hearing once a 
remedy was imposed. 358 Arcadia Acres contended that HHS would 
use these noncompliance findings to determine the amount of penal-
ties for future noncompliance findings. 359 Arcadia Acres asked the 
ALJ to proceed "to a hearing on the findings of deficiencies in order 
to protect against 'injustice' resulting from unjust and inadequate sur-
vey results [] and because, '[i]f not in the instant appeal, where else 
will Arcadia Acres have a forum?'"360 To resolve the case, the ALJ 
referred to the Secretary's response during the notice and comment 
352 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (fmal detennination); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage Manor of_Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); Lutheran Home - Caledonia, DAB No. 
CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakewood 
Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial 
detennination); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CRll 04 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); Manorcare Health Servs. Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 2004). 
353 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1996) (initial detennination). 
354 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial detennination). 
355 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial determination). 
356 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial detennination). 
357 This section was redesignated as 498.3(b)(l3) in 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 
18549 (Apr. 7, 2000). Only the imposition of certain remedies grants the nursing 
home a~peal rights. See 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(13) (2005). 
58 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial detennination). 
359 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial determination). 
360 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial determination). 
770 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 16:723 
period of the Medicare regulations that nursing homes do not receive 
a hearing when no remedy is imposed because there is no injury.361 
The ALJ ruled in favor of HHS because when promulgating the com-
pliance regulations the Secretary specifically rejected the claim that 
any dissatisfied nursing home had a right to appeal noncompliance 
fmdings unless a remedy was imposed. 362 
Contrary to the ALI's holding in Arcadia Acres, this practice is 
not speculative and does cause nursing homes injury, reputation, and 
financial harm. Although no remedy is imposed, the allegations of 
noncompliance remain posted on the Intemet.363 The findings are also 
reported to the nursing home ombudsman, the physicians and skilled 
nursing facility administration licensing board, and the State Medicaid 
fraud and abuse control units. 364 This information is used by Con-
sumer Reports to publish a report on poor-performing nursing 
homes.365 As part of the public record, these fmdings harm the reputa-
tion of the facility. No patient wants to stay in a nursing home with a 
bad compliance record. It also causes financial harm. The fmdings are 
used to impose hasher remedies if there are future violations of the 
Medicare compliance regulations366 and can be used to support Medi-
care. fraud and abuse claims.367 Insurance companies also use the in-
formation to determine yearly insurance premiums for nursing 
homes. 368 Hence, nursing homes are harmed by the denial of a right to 
challenge noncompliance findings when no remedy is imposed. Fur-
thermore, without a right to a hearing to challenge this harm, nursing 
361 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (initial determination).( citing 59 Fed. Reg. 56158 (Nov. 10 1994). 
362 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep 't of Health & Human Servs. 
1996) (initial determination). The ALJ further held that the possibility ofHHS impos-
ing sanctions against the facility in the future on the basis of its findings of noncom-
pliance was speculative and outside any definition of"initial determination" entitling 
the facility to a hearing under 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.3(b)(13) & (d) and 488.330(e)(3). 
Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 1996) (initial 
determination). 
363 See Medicare.gov, Nursing Home Compare, http://www.medicare.gov/ 
NHComp,are/Home.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
3 4 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(g)(5) (West 2005). The information remains posted 
until fue next annual survey is conducted. 
365 See Consumer Reports, 2004 Nursing Home Watch List (by state), May 3, 
2005, http://www.consumerreports.org (search "2004 Nursing Home Watch List"; 
then follow the first link). 
366 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404, 488.438 (2005). 
367 Krause, supra note 16, at 95-98. 
368 Currently in many states, such as Texas, Florida and Illinois, many nursing 
homes are forced to operate without insurance or go out of business because insur-
ance companies are unwilling to offer nursing homes with less than perfect compli-
ance histories reasonable insurance rates. See Anderson, supra note 42. at 21A. 
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homes cannot seek federal review of this unconstitutional practice 
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Ill. Counci/.369 
3. The Secretary's Statements in Ill. Council 
Six years after the promulgation of the Medicare regulations and 
four years after the decision in Arcadia Acres, the Secretary inter-
preted the Medicare Act to include a right to a hearing regardless of 
whether a remedy was imposed.370 When the Supreme Court asked the 
Secretary in Ill. Council what hearing rights were afforded nursing 
homes under Medicare, the Secretary stated that any "dissatisfied" 
nursing home was entitled to review any determination that it "failed 
to comply substantially with the statute, agreements, or regulations, 
whether termination or some other remedy [was] imposed."371 Based 
on this interpretation, the Supreme Court ruled that nursing homes had 
to present their case first to HHS and receive a final ruling because 
HHS' s administrative review process did provide meaningful review 
of claims. 372 This practice of HHS does bar the entire industry from 
obtaining review, because no nursing home has the right to adminis-
trative or federal review if a remedy is not imposed. A case presented 
to HHS is summarily dismissed without the issuance of a final ruling, 
barring nursing homes from federal review under Ill. Council. 373 
Hence, the nursing home industry should be allowed to bring 
cases in federal court for review without having to present claims to 
HHS and receiving a final ruling from HHS, because just like the phy-
sicians in Bowen, the nursing home industry has been left without 
access to any meaningful review. Even when nursing homes are af-
forded a hearing, the hearing process conducted is minimal at best. In 
fact, the actual hearing process has been limited to the submission of 
369 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council), 529 U.S. 1, 
22-23 (2000). 
370 !d. 
371 !d. at 21. 
372 !d. at 24. 
373 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. 1607 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
1997) (final determination); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 1999); Heritage Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000); Lutheran Home - Caledonia, DAB No. 
CR674 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial determination); Lakewood 
Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR691 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2000) (initial 
determination); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CR1104 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2003); Manorcare Health Servs. Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. 2004). 
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all direct testimony through affidavits and in-person cross-
examination. 374 Although the current Medicare regulations that grant 
nursing homes procedural due process guarantee a right to a full evi-
dentiary hearing on the record,375 ALJs of HHS have seemingly re-
verted back to the "informal hearing" process used by HHS in 1986, 
without any formal change in the rules. 
B. Full Evidentiary Hearings through Written Submission 
Beginning in 2002, some of the eight ALJ's decided to reconsider 
what 42 C.F.R. § 498 meant when it said a full and fair hearing must 
be conducted.376 Three of the ALJs began to require that all direct 
testimony of witnesses be ·submitted through written submissions, 
only allowing the participants to cross-examine witnesses at their full 
evidentiary hearing.377 These ALJs imposed requirements even though 
in each case there were issues of material fact in dispute. Now direct 
testimony is submitted in the form of affidavits.378 The affidavits do 
not include questions that the witness was asked and there is no means 
by which parties can object to the statements made in the affidavits.379 
TheALJs, employees ofHHS, made this modification without issuing 
any new rulings, regulations, or policy memos justifying this 
374 For Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing with in-
person direct testimony, compare DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
375 See 42 C.P.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66 (2005). 
376 According to 42 C.P.R. § 498, which governs the hearing process, in-
person witness testimony is a required element of the nursing home hearing. 42 
C.P.R. § 498.62. In fact, the regulations state that witnesses will testify at the in-
person hearing, without any mention that this testimony is limited to cross-
examination. 42 C.P.R. § 498.62. 
377 See DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) (initial 
pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); DAB No. C-
05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (peti-
tioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
378 See DAB No. C-04-401; DAB No. C-05-445. 
379 See DAB No. C-04-401; DAB No. C-05-445. 
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change?80 These changes are arbitrarily applied-not all ALJs prevent 
in-court testimony381-and directly contradict the Constitution, the 
plain language of the statute and regulations governing nursing home 
hearings, and the AP A. 382 
1. Constitutional Violation 
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court ruled that the amount of proce-
dural due process required by the Constitution to be provided when 
individuals were deprived of property was proportionate to the harm 
suffered.383 To evaluate what process was due, the Court reviewed 
three factors: (1) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest and 
the reduction of risk, if any, from the addition of procedural safe-
guards; (2) the private interest that was affected by the official action; 
and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would en-
tail.384 In applying these three factors in Eldridge, the Court found that 
a post-termination hearing held in front of an ALJ with in-person wit-
ness testimony was sufficient process. 
When Eldridge is applied to the arbitrary decision of three of the 
eight ALJs to hold partial or informal hearings for nursing homes to 
challenge noncompliance findings, it is clear that this practice does 
not provide nursing homes with the process proportionate to their 
harm for two reasons. First, the hearing process used by HHS in El-
dridge was standard. It did not change from one ALJ to the next.385 
The uniformity of the process was significant because the Court found 
that it reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation of disability payments 
and thus additional procedural safeguards were not necessary.386 The 
380 See DAB No. C-04-401; DAB No. C-05-445; 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 
498.62, 498.66 (2005). 
381 For Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing with in-
person direct testimony, see DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); 
DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); DAB No. C-05-404 (Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name con-
cealed) (on file with author); DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 
2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
382 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66. See also Dep't Appeals Board, 
Civil Remedies Division, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Procedures (providing 
hearing ~rocedures for the Civil Remedies Division of the DAB) (on file with author). 
3 3 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
384 Jd at 335. 
385 Jd at 340, 343. 
386 Jd. at 345, 349. 
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Medicare compliance hearing process for nursing homes is not stan-
dard. Nursing homes are subject to the whims of the ALJ. Some allow 
a full evidentiary hearing, while others only allow in-person cross-
examination.387 This random process does not reduce the risk of the 
erroneous deprivation of Medicare payments. In fact, it actually in-
creases the risk of erroneous deprivation. There are no means by 
which a nursing home can challenge the assertions made by HHS wit-
nesses in their affidavits. So the information is placed in the record. 
Additionally, ALJs cannot make credibility decisions based on 
written testimony and not every witness is called for cross-
examination. Without hearing the direct testimony of witnesses at an 
in-person hearing, an ALI's ability to determine the veracity and 
credibility of the witness is limited to a few questions on cross-
examination and rebuttal. 388 If the only testimony heard from the 
witness is an answer of "yes" and "no," which is usually the only 
testimony elicited on cross-examination, ALJs will not be able to 
reasonably determine the veracity and the credibility of each witness. 
Without first determining the veracity and credibility of the witness, it 
will be impossible for ALJs to assign the proper relevance and weight 
to. each of the witness's testimony. Because there are genuine issues of 
material of fact and no admissions of fact in all cases, it is simply not 
enough that the submissions of direct testimony will be in the form of 
an affidavit. ALJs must hear witnesses' entire testimony to determine 
the credibility of each witness and the weight of all the evidence 
presented to resolve the disputed issues of material fact. 
Second, the Court in Eldridge found that the harm suffered by 
Eldridge was minimal because Eldridge could sustain himself by 
applying for welfare during the reconsideration process. 389 Therefore, 
Eldridge's interest in the continuation of his disability benefits was 
387 Compare Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing 
with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) ~etitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
88 This assumes that the witness will be cross-examined at the hearing. 
389 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340. 
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outweighed by the government's fiscal interests in protecting the 
Treasury against erroneous payments and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedures would entail.390 In the case of 
nursing home hearings, the government is not protecting its fiscal 
interests by denying nursing homes a right to a full evidentiary 
hearing. HHS is not protecting its fiscal interests by not granting a full 
evidentiary hearing because once remedies are imposed they continue 
to incur until the completion of the case, which can range several 
years. Moreover, the three ALJs are no more administratively 
burdened by providing a full evidentiary hearing than the five other 
ALJs that currently provide a hearing. Nursing homes, however, are 
harmed from the limitation of their hearing rights because they are not 
afforded a meaningful chance to challenge the remedy imposed or the 
noncompliance findings. If the ALJ affirms the imposition of a 
remedy imposed, nursing homes do not have any safety net system 
from which to draw money. Therefore, the interests of the nursing 
home to protect its financial solvency are greater than the need of 
three ALJs to streamline the hearing process. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the amount of procedural due proc-
ess an individual received was based on three factors: (1) the risk of 
the erroneous deprivation of such interest and the reduction of risk, if 
any, from the addition of procedural safeguards; (2) the individual's 
interest; and (3) the government's interest in protecting financial sol-
vency of the Treasury.391 When these factors are applied to the limita-
tions placed on nursing home compliance hearings by three ALJs the 
process provided is not enough. The use of affidavits is not a standard 
agency practice and was only implemented by three ALJs for judicial 
economy. But this practice increases the risk of erroneous deprivation 
because ALJs cannot make credibility decisions based on written tes-
timony essential to fact driven cases. Furthermore, this practice does 
not protect the government's financial or administrative interests. No 
money or time is saved by the ALJs using this system because they 
still must review all the affidavits to i:nake a decision. However, nurs-
ing homes are harmed by the practice because they do not receive a 
full evidentiary hearing in which they are able to challenge the factual 
findings of HHS. Thus, the ALJs must give nursing homes a full evi-
dentiary hearing to comply with the requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment. The actions of the ALJs also violate the plain language 
of the Medicare Act and regulations that provide for a full evidentiary 
hearing with oral direct testimony. 
390 Id. at 348. 
391 Id. at 335. 
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2. Violation of Plain Language of Medicare Act and Regulations 
Section 1395cc(h)(l)(A) of the Medicare Act mandates that nurs-
ing homes be granted the same hearing rights provided under section 
405(b) of the Social Security Act.392 Section 405(b) guarantees a right 
to: 
[R ]easonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with re-
spect to such decision .... In the course of any hearing, inves-
tigation, or other proceeding, the Commissioner may adminis-
ter oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive 
evidence. 393 
This was further codified in the Medicare regulations. 394 According to 
42 C.F.R. § 498.60, the ALJ must inquire fully into all matters at issue 
and receive into evidence the testimony of witnesses and any docu-
ments that are relevant and material at the in-person hearing.395 
Clearly, this means that witnesses are required to present their entire 
testimony at the in-person hearing, because the regulation does not 
distinguish between direct- or cross-examination of witnesses. This 
regulation further states that the ALJ decides the order in which the 
evidence and the arguments of the parties are presented and the con-
duct of the hearing.396 Although ALJs may decide the conduct of the 
hearing, this authority is limited by 42 C.F.R. § 498.62, which gov-
erns witness's testimony.397 The regulation states: 
The representative of each party is permitted to examine his 
or her own witnesses subject to interrogation by the represen-
tative of the other party. The ALJ may ask any questions that 
he or she deems necessary. The ALJ rules upon any objection 
made by either party as to the propriety of any question?98 
Therefore, according to 42 C.F.R. § 498.62, a witness's entire testi-
mony shall be given at the in-person hearing so that the ALJ may ask 
questions and rule upon objections. 
392 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(h)(l)(A) (West 2005). 
393 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b)(l) (West 2005). Section 1395cc(h)(l)(A) incorpo-
rates sections 405(b), (g), and (h) applicable to the Medicare Act. The Medicare Act 
grants nursing homes the right to a hearing to the same extent as 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), 
(g). See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(h)(l)(A). 
394 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66 (2005). 
395 42 C.F.R. § 498.60. 
396 42 C.F.R. § 498.60. 
397 42 C.F.R. § 498.60. 
398 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (emphasis added). 
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If direct testimony is in the form of an affidavit, the ALJ will not 
be able to ask timely questions regarding the witness's testimony 
which may serve to clarify some disputed issues of material fact. Fur-
thermore, because the questions asked of witnesses never appear in 
their affidavit, the opportunity for parties to make objections "to the 
propriety of any question" as required by 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 is non-
existent. Instead of being granted the opportunity to keep inadmissible 
statements out of evidence, parties are limited to filing broad motions 
to strike witness statements, requiring the ALJ to review the statement 
and then determine its admissibility. Moreover, the submission of 
direct testimony through affidavits violates the requirements of 42 
C.F.R. § 498.66. 
According to 42 C.F.R. § 498.66, a party must file a written 
waiver of the right to appear and present evidence to waive its right to 
an oral hearing.399 In fact, 42 C.F.R. § 498.66 states that an oral hear-
ing must be conducted unless "an affected party wishes to waive its 
right to appear and present evidence at the hearing" by filing "a writ-
ten waiver with the ALJ."400 Even when a nursing home has not sub-
mitted a written waiver of its right to appear and present evidence, 
ALJs are implementing these policies.401 This contravenes the plain 
meaning of the regulation, because in these cases there has been no 
admission of fact by either party; thus, the ALJ must conduct an oral 
hearing because it is "necessary to clarify the facts at issue."402 These 
practices not only violate the plain language of the Medicare Act and 
regulations,403 but they also violate the hearing provisions of the APA. 
399 42 C.F.R. § 498.66. 
400 42 C.F.R. § 498.66. 
401 For Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu of 
in-person testimony, see DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author); DAB 
No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) 
(petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
402 42 C.F.R. § 498.66. 
403 When HHS wanted to limit an agency's hearing process it was quite clear. 
For example, when HHS created a hearing process for laboratories under the Clinical 
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) it specifically limited the rights oflabora-
tories. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.201. CLIA made every laboratory in the country that tests 
human specimens for health reasons subject to federal regulation regardless of 
whether it participated in a government program or it tested specimens in interstate 
commerce. See Granting and Withdrawal of Deeming Authority to Private Nonprofit 
Accreditation Organizations and of CLIA Exemption Under State Laboratory Pro-
grams, 57 Fed. Reg. 33992 (Jul. 31, 1992). A laboratory dissatisfied with HHS's 
determination has a right to seek reconsideration regardless of whether a remedy has 
been imposed. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.201. CLIA laboratories are given an informal 
hearing in front of a hearing officer. 42 C.F.R. § 488.201. In addition, laboratories are 
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3. Administrative Procedure Act Violation 
Section 5 54 of the AP A provides a hearing in every case of adju-
dication required by statute to be determined on the record.404 Before 
section 554 of the AP A can apply, the statute must clearly mandate a 
hearing on the record. Moreover, the Supreme Court has "also implied 
that formal adjudication procedures are only necessary when a statue 
uses the magic words 'on the record. "'405 Thus, HHS is required to 
provide nursing homes a right to a hearing if the Medicare statute pro-
vides a hearing on the record. The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed this 
proposition in Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson.406 
In Crestview, a skilled nursing home located in Ohio was sur-
veyed by the Ohio Department of Health on August 12, 1999, and 
found out of compliance with the Medicare regulations.407 The Ohio 
Department of Health revisited the facility four times before finding 
the facility in compliance on October 21, 1999.408 HHS imposed a 
$400-a-day civil money penalty from October 5 to October 21.409 On 
December 30, 1999, Crestview sent a letter of appeal to an ALJ chal-
lenging the imposition of the $400-a-day civil money penalty and the 
facts supporting the penalty.41° Crestview and HHS participated in a 
pre-hearing conference with the ALJ on September 10, 2001.411 Sub-
sequently, the parties exchanged pre-hearing briefs. On December 12, 
2001, the ALJ informed the parties that the case would be resolved 
allowed to present witness testimony at the hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 488.205. Although 
laboratories are afforded these rights, this process is only minimal compared to nurs-
ing home hearings. The process for laboratories is entitled "informal hearing" while 
the process for nursing homes is called a "hearing." See 42 C.F.R. § 488.205. Second, 
the hearing process for laboratories is conducted in front of a hearing officer, while 
nursing homes have the right to present evidence to an ALJ. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 
488.207, 498.5. Furthermore, laboratories are limited as to using authorized represen-
tatives and technical advisors witnesses, whereas, nursing homes are granted the 
unlimited option of bringing to the hearing anyone whose "presence the ALJ consid-
ers necessary or proper." 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.207(b)(l), 498.60. Hence, when HHS 
wanted to limit the due process rights afforded in a hearing it stated so clearly in the 
regulations governing laboratories. 
404 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
405 Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654-55 (1990) (affirming agency's use of 
informal hearing process without an oral hearing because statute did not require the 
hearing to be on the record)). 
406 !d. at 743. 
407 !d. at 744-45. 
408 !d. at 745. 
409 !d. 
410 !d. 
411 !d. 
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without an in-person hearing because there were no genuine issues of 
material fact. 412 The ALJ ruled in favor ofHHS and the DAB affirmed 
the ALJ's ruling.413 Crestview appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit. 
The Court ruled that nursing homes had a right to an in-person 
hearing based on section 554 of the AP A and the Medicare statute and 
regulations.414 The Court held that section 554 of the APA provided a 
right to an in-person hearing if the statute required the agency to grant 
an opportunity to be heard on the record. 415 Because section 
1395cc(h)(l)(A) of the Medicare Act guaranteed nursing homes the 
right to a hearing on the record with in-person witness testimony, the 
Court held that Crestview was entitled to an in-person hearing.416 
Even with this ruling, some ALJs still limit the hearing to in-person 
cross-examination.417 
When nursing homes are granted a right to a hearing, some ALJs 
are limiting the formal hearing process to written direct testimony and 
in-person cross-examination.418 Section 556 of the APA prevents the 
412 !d. at 745-46. 
413 !d. at 746. 
414 !d. at 748. 
415 !d. 
416 !d. The court further noted that the Medicare regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 
498.3(a)(1), 488.330(e)(3(ii), 498.60-62, and 498.66 clearly provided nursing homes 
the right to an in person hearing. !d. at 749. For further discussion of these regulatory 
requirements see supra Part N .B.l. 
417 Compare Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing 
with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2004) 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
418 Compare Initial Hearing Orders that provide a full evidentiary hearing 
with in-person direct testimony, DAB No. C-00-438 (Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. 2000) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with 
author), DAB No. C-02-172 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2002) (initial pre-
hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), DAB No. C-05-
404 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's 
name concealed) (on file with author), and DAB No. C-06-189 (Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. 2006) (initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file 
with author), with Initial Hearing Orders that require written direct testimony in lieu 
· of in-person testimony, DAB No. C-04-401 (Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs. 2004) 
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use of this informal hearing process. APA § 556 requires ALJs to pro-
vide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitive 
evidence and requires the presentation of evidence at an oral hear-
ing.419 This section explicitly limits the intake of evidence to that 
which is material to the case. Submitting affidavits for direct testi-
mony negates a nursing home's right to object to hearsay or irrelevant, 
immaterial, and unduly repetitive evidence. This allows HHS to to-
tally control the case because it will be able to submit surveyors' writ-
ten direct testimony without allowing a nursing home to object to the 
relevance or scope of the testimony. 
There is no procedure in place for each party to object to state-
ments made in the written direct testimony of witnesses. Thus, if a 
witness' direct testimony is not given at an in-person hearing, a nurs-
ing home will not have an opportunity to object to HHS's written 
submissions or ask HHS witnesses about disputed facts not covered in 
their direct testimony. Therefore, simply allowing HHS witnesses to 
submit written direct testimony without the opportunity for objection 
to hearsay or the relevance and scope of the testimony violates section 
556 ofthe APA.420 
According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution provides an in-
dividual challenging the deprivation of property with a right to a hear-
ing.421 This hearing can take many forms; however, the type of hear-
ing granted is based on the risk of erroneous deprivation of property 
and the dictates of the governing statute and regulations.422 Nursing 
homes are not granted a hearing before they are deprived of property, 
namely Medicare payments. When no remedy is imposed, nursing 
homes are summarily denied a hearing, even though they lose Medi-
care payments by a decrease in admission and Medicare fraud and 
abuse actions. Furthermore, when nursing homes are granted a right to 
a hearing, the hearing is so limited it increases the risk of the errone-
ous deprivation of Medicare payments. 
Some ALJs have arbitrarily limited the hearing process to in-
person cross-examination directly contradicting the plain language of 
(initial pre-hearing order) (petitioner's name concealed) (on file with author), and 
DAB No. C-05-445 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2005) (initial pre-hearing 
order) ~etitioner's name concealed) (on file with author). 
19 
"Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a 
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious evidence." 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d) (West 2005). 
420 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 556. 
421 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 319 (1976) (stating that the Due Process Clause provides individuals with a 
right to a hearing when they are being deprived of a constitutionally protected right). 
422 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
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the Medicare Act and regulations, the intent of the Medicare Act and 
regulations, and the AP A. This limitation does not allow for either the 
evaluation of witness credibility or the exclusion of irrelevant, imma-
terial, and unduly repetitive evidence. These violations could be re-
solved if nursing homes could challenge the constitutionality of these 
practices. HHS does not have the authority to rectify these constitu-
tional violations; the federal courts have sole and original jurisdiction 
to hear these issues. However, nursing homes cannot bring these ac-
tions to federal court because of the Supreme Court's decision in Ill. 
Council that nursing homes were prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 
and (h) from seeking federal court review unless the nursing home 
presented that case to HHS and received a final ruling. Thus, the 
Court effectively barred nursing homes from any meaningful review. 
Without access to federal court, the only solution for nursing homes is 
to hope that HHS changes its policies. 
C. Solutions 
The denial of procedural due process is a violation of the Consti-
tution, the AP A, and the Medicare Act and regulations. Unless HHS 
imposes a remedy for fmdings of noncompliance, nursing homes are 
denied access to a hearing. However, nursing homes are still deprived 
of property through the imposition of later fines based on these unre-
viewable findings, Medicare fraud and abuse claims, and increased 
insurance premiums. This situation could be resolved by the reversal 
of Ill. Council. The Court's decision in Ill. Council affirmed the 
Medicare Act's bar of federal review until a case had been presented 
to HHS and a fmal ruling had been issued.423 The Court ruled in this 
manner because it relied on inaccurate statements of HHS that nursing 
homes were provided with meaningful review.424 In reality, HHS does 
not grant nursing homes any review. Therefore, nursing homes should 
have a right to challenge this practice in federal court without present-
ing the case to HHS. 
When nursing homes are granted a right to a hearing, HHS should 
provide them with a full evidentiary hearing that includes witness 
testimony as mandated by the Medicare Act and regulations.425 This 
will preserve fairness and due process in Medicare compliance hear-
ings. To ensure timely resolution of cases to protect the lives of nurs-
ing home residents and permit nursing homes an opportunity to pro-
423 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Ill. Council), 529 U.S. 1, 
12 (2000). 
424 !d. at 21. 
425 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-66 (2005). 
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teet their fmancial interests and reputation, HHS should also hire more 
ALJs to hear cases. If a nursing home is not afforded a hearing, then 
HHS should post the facility's hearing request on their website along 
with their alleged non-compliance findings. 
Finally, HHS should automatically waive the fmality requirement 
for constitutional challenges so that nursing homes can immediately 
enter federal court. This would allow HHS to save time and money 
bypa,ssing menial debates concerning compliance when the nursing 
home is only challenging the constitutionality of the procedures used. 
The implementation of these solutions would not entail any additional 
expense and would actually improve the system for the benefit of the 
nursing homes as well as the residents. The timely resolution of nurs-
ing home compliance hearings ensures that instead of wasting time on 
fight allegations of noncompliance, the nursing home can focus on the 
quality of residents. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental requirement of due process is to be heard "at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."426 The failure of fed-
eral administrative agencies to provide the due process rights guaran-
teed by the agency's governing statute, regulations, and policy state-
ments contravenes the protections guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause: the fundamental right of Americans regulated by the federal 
government to receive due process of law when deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property. HHS's limitation of nursing homes' hearing rights is 
one example of this contravention. Understandably, the money spent 
by HHS justifies rigorous regulation of nursing homes to ensure that 
residents receive quality care. However, arbitrary and capricious regu-
lation of nursing homes that leaves them without any avenue to chal-
lenge the agency's actions violates the procedural due process rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Ill. Council upholding the bar to 
federal review until presentment to HHS and a final agency ruling, 
even if the claims are constitutional in nature, created a fundamental 
flaw in the nursing home hearing process. Nursing homes have no 
right to a hearing to challenge any finding of noncompliance and even 
when granted a hearing there is no meaningful review. The Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Constitution requires HHS to provide nursing homes 
a full evidentiary hearing when they are deprived of property. HHS 
426 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
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uses these findings of noncompliance to impose fines and deny Medi-
care payments for new admissions on the nursing home in later sur-
veys.427 These actions deprive nursing homes of property, Medicare 
payments, and money, with no hearing. These practices also violate 
the Medicare Act because they harm the nursing home. lffiS is re-
quired under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5) to report their fmdings to the 
public by posting it on their website. This harms the nursing home's 
reputation. Additionally, lffiS uses these findings as the basis of 
Medicare fraud and abuse actions. If the survey shows that the nursing 
home did not provide care, but still received payment for the care, the 
nursing home committed fraud. If a nursing home is found guilty of 
fraud, then the facility has to pay lffiS back the Medicare payment 
plus three times that amount. This is financial harm. Nursing homes 
cannot obtain agency review for these claims and are barred from 
federal review. 
This abrogation of rights has pushed the industry to near collapse 
because not only do alleged violations of Medicare regulations serve 
as the basis for Medicaid actions, 428 but also insurance companies use 
these findings in determining yearly insurance premiums for nursing 
homes.429 Therefore, procedural due process rights, or lack thereof, 
afforded to nursing homes to challenge alleged violations of the 
Medicare regulations are paramount to a nursing home's continued 
operation. To comply with the Medicare statute and regulations, lffiS 
should provide nursing homes with timely full evidentiary hearings 
and allow facilities with constitutional challenges, that the agency has 
no authority to decide, proceed to federal court. By puttmg these solu-
tions in place, HHS can streamline the process so that cases are 
quickly and fairly resolved, while still protecting the care provided 
nursing home residents. 
427 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404, 488.438. 
428 See 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, §§ 300.200(e)(l) & (f) (2006). See gen-
erally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(g)(l)(A) (West 2005). 
429 See Anderson, supra note 42, at 21A. Liability insurance rates, tied to 
litigation costs and the quality of care, have increased on average I ,000 percent since 
I998.Id 
